Can Compulsory Arbitration Be Reconciled With Section 7 Rights? by Hodges, Ann C.
University of Richmond
UR Scholarship Repository
Law Faculty Publications School of Law
2003
Can Compulsory Arbitration Be Reconciled With
Section 7 Rights?
Ann C. Hodges
University of Richmond, ahodges@richmond.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/law-faculty-publications
Part of the Dispute Resolution and Arbitration Commons, and the Labor and Employment Law
Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Law
Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.
Recommended Citation
Ann C. Hodges, Can Compulsory Arbitration Be Reconciled With Section 7 Rights?, 38 Wake Forest L. Rev. 173 (2003).
CAN COMPULSORY ARBITRATION BE RECONCILED 
WITH SECTION 7 RIGHTS? 
Ann C. Hodges* 
Employers are increasingly imposing arbitration agreements on 
their employees as a condition of employment. These agreements 
force the employees to arbitrate, rather than litigate, any legal 
claims arising out of their employment. For employees covered 
by the National Labor Relations Act, such agreements may 
impair their rights to engage in concerted activity, since 
litigation of employment claims is protected by Section 7. 
Employee rights to file class actions, consolidate claims, and 
seek broad injunctive relief are concerted actions that are 
particularly threatened by the move to compelled arbitration. 
The Article analyzes the impact of arbitration agreements on 
various forms of activity protected by Section 7, urging the 
National Labor Relations Board and the courts to invalidate 
agreements that diminish Section 7 rights. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, arbitration agreements have proliferated in 
numerous sectors of the economy. Employees increasingly find 
themselves faced with the choice of agreeing to arbitrate disputes or 
refusing to enter into an employment relationship. The Supreme 
Court's decision in Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 1 finding 
arbitration provisions in employment contracts enforceable under 
the Federal Arbitration Act, 2 has spurred additional employers to 
adopt arbitration provisions for nonunion employees. 
The employer promulgating the agreement selects the rules 
under which the arbitration will proceed. Some businesses are 
* Professor of Law, University of Richmond School of Law. The Article 
benefited from valuable comments on earlier drafts by Professors Matthew W. 
Fink.in, Martin H. Malin, and Jean R. Sternlight, and the research assistance of 
Courtney Mueller Coke, J.D. 2002, University of Richmond School of Law. I am 
grateful for financial support from the Hunton & Williams Summer Research 
Fund and the University of Richmond School of Law. 
1. 532 U.S. 105 (2001). 
2. Id. at 119. 
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using arbitration agreements in an attempt to avoid class action law 
suits. 3 Others impose at least half of the cost of arbitration on the 
employee.4 Employees forced into arbitration frequently lose the 
opportunity to proceed on a class basis and may be denied some 
forms of injunctive relief. The cost of arbitration and the abolition of 
class actions provide significant potential for virtually eliminating 
small claims and claims by lower wage employees, unable to afford 
3. Attorney Urges Employers to Adopt Mandatory Programs as Risk 
Management Tools, 17 INDIVIDUAL EMP. RTS. 41, 42 (2001) (noting that major 
advantages of mandatory arbitration are capping damages and eliminating 
class actions); Paul E. Starkman, Open Issues After Circuit City: Still No Easy 
Answers on Mandatory Arbitration, 27 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 69, 76 (2002) (noting 
that arbitration can prevent class actions-the "bane of employers"); Jean R. 
Sternlight, As Mandatory Binding Arbitration Meets the Class Action, Will the 
Class Action Survive?, 42 WM. & MARYL. REV. 1, 5-6, 9 (2000). In one of the 
few empirical studies of arbitration agreements, Professor Christopher 
Drahozal found that eighteen of thirty-four arbitration clauses in franchise 
agreements precluded class relief, either expressly, or by limiting arbitration to 
the franchiser. Christopher R. Drahozal, "Unfair" Arbitration Clauses, 2001 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 695, 731-32. The costs and potential liability resulting from class 
action lawsuits have caused employers to seek various ways to avoid class 
action claims. For recent articles advising employers on how to avoid such 
claims, see G. Roger King & Jeffrey D. Winchester, Building an Internal 
Defense Against Class Action Lawsuits and Disparate Impact Claims, 16 LAB. 
LAw. 371 (2001); Deborah A. Sudbury et al., Keeping the Monster in the Closet: 
Avoiding Employment Class Actions, EMP. REL. L.J., Autumn 2000, at 5 
[hereinafter Sudbury et al., Keeping the Monster in the Closet]; Deborah A. 
Sudbury et al., Section 216(b) Collective Actions: A Vehicle for Group-Initiated 
Claims, EMP. REL. L.J., Autumn 2001, at 45, 64-65 [hereinafter Sudbury et al., 
Collective Actions]. 
4. Some courts have refused to enforce or rewritten arbitration 
agreements that charge fees for cases involving statutory claims. See, e.g., 
Ferguson v. Countrywide Credit Indus., Inc., 298 F.3d 778, 780-88 (9th Cir. 
2002) (refusing to enforce unilaterally imposed arbitration agreement that 
required the employee to pay half of the arbitration costs, covered claims 
employers are likely to bring but excluded those employees are likely to bring, 
and contained discovery provisions favorable to the employer); Paladino v. 
Avnet Computer Techs., Inc., 134 F.3d 1054, 1059-60 (11th Cir. 1998) (refusing 
to require arbitration where large fees were imposed on employee and Title VII 
damages were not available); Cole v. Burns Int'l Sec. Serva., 105 F.3d 1465, 
1468 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (reading agreement to require employer to pay all fees in 
order to enforce arbitration agreement). Other courts have enforced such 
agreements. See, e.g., Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 
Inc., 170 F.3d 1, 16 (1st Cir. 1999) (finding that fee-splitting provision did not 
affect enforceability of arbitration agreement). The Supreme Court recently 
held that an agreement which failed to specify the amount and apportionment 
of fees was enforceable because the plaintiff, although arguing that the cost was 
prohibitive, did not meet her burden of showing that the cost was so great that 
it would impermissibly interfere with her right to vindicate her claim. See 
Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 90-91 (2000). 
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individual arbitration.5 In addition, the opportunity for broad relief, 
which has the potential to eliminate unlawful conduct directed at 
many employees, and thus to achieve the public purpose behind 
many employment statutes, may be lost. 
The National Labor Relations Act's ("Act" or "NLRA") protection 
of concerted activity has been virtually ignored in the debate about 
the enforceability of arbitration agreements imposed as a condition 
of employment.6 The National Labor Relations Board's ("NLRB" or 
5. In EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., for example, the employee was paid 
$5.50 per hour and was terminated after two weeks of employment. 193 F.3d 
805, 807, 816 (4th Cir. 1999), rev'd, 534 U.S. 279 (2002). The arbitration fees 
included a $2000 filing fee, paid prior to the arbitration, a $250 per day 
administrative fee, which was divided between the employer and the employee, 
and hourly arbitrator fees to be divided between the parties. Brief of Amici 
Curiae National Employment Lawyers Association et al. at 3-4, EEOC v. Waffle 
House, Inc., 193 F.3d 805 (4th Cir. 1999), rev'd, 534 U.S. 279 (2002) (No. 99-
1823). In Waffle House, the employer argued that the EEOC could not seek or 
obtain relief on behalf of the employee who had entered into an arbitration 
agreement. Waffle House, Inc, 193 F.3d at 808. Although the Fourth Circuit 
agreed with the employer, the Supreme Court rejected the argument, providing 
at least one avenue for recovery by low wage employees forced to agree to 
arbitration. EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 284-87, 298 (2002). The 
EEOC's limited resources prevent it from litigating on behalf of most 
employees, however. See id. at 290 n. 7 (stating that "in fiscal year 2000, the 
EEOC received 79,896 charges of employment discrimination. Although the 
EEOC found reasonable cause in 8,248 charges, it only filed 291 lawsuits"). 
Professor St. Antoine has argued that arbitration may provide the best venue 
for the claims of "the ordinary blue- or pink-collar claimant." Theodore J. St. 
Antoine, The Changing Role of Labor Arbitration, 76 IND. L.J. 83, 93 (2001). He 
suggests that such employees may be unable to obtain legal representation for 
their lawsuits, may have more difficulty prevailing in court than in arbitration, 
and may suffer long delays in litigation. Id. at 91-92. He conditions his 
argument on the availability of due process safeguards in arbitration. Id. at 93. 
For a similar argument, see Samuel Estreicher, Saturns for Rickshaws: The 
Stakes in the Debate over Predispute Employment Arbitration Agreements, 16 
OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 559, 563-64 (2001) [hereinafter Estreicher, Saturns 
for Rickshaws]. While the suggestion is well worthy of further consideration, 
the value of arbitration for individuals will depend on a number of factors, 
including whether they are able to obtain capable representation by either 
lawyers or union representatives, whether the cost is affordable in relation to 
the value of the claim, and whether they can effectively participate in arbitrator 
selection. Many current compulsory arbitration systems do not meet these 
requirements. If the arbitration system does not prove to be an effective vehicle 
for statutory enforcement, then employers who impose arbitration systems on 
their employees will get a pass on statutory compliance, since most enforcement 
agencies are under funded and overworked. 
6. I have argued elsewhere that individual arbitration agreements cannot 
be imposed unilaterally on employees represented by a union because of the 
impact of such arbitration on mandatory subjects of bargaining. See Ann C. 
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"Board") General Counsel has taken the position that such 
agreements violate the Act where they impede access to the NLRB. 
Several administrative law judges have agreed,7 but the Board itself 
has not addressed the issue directly, 8 and no court has considered 
the argument. The General Counsel has declined to issue 
complaints where the right to file charges with the Board is clearly 
preserved by the arbitration agreement.9 But the Act itself broadly 
protects the right to engage in concerted activity, which includes 
legal action to vindicate employment rights, and prohibits employers 
from interfering with such rights. While the right to engage in 
concerted activity can, in some cases, be waived, employment cannot 
be conditioned on the waiver of the right to participate in concerted 
activity. 
This Article looks at the question of whether the NLRA's right 
to engage in concerted activity protects employees from being forced 
to agree to arbitration of employment claims as a condition of 
employment. 10 First, the Article provides an introduction to 
employment arbitration. Then it reviews the General Counsel's 
position on mandatory arbitration agreements and related agency 
decisions. The Article goes on to explore whether filing a lawsuit to 
enforce statutory or contractual employment rights is protected 
under the NLRA, as concerted activity for mutual aid and 
protection. Then, it analyzes the NLRB and court decisions holding 
that employers cannot require employees to waive their right to 
engage in concerted activity. In analyzing the application of the 
NLRA to compulsory arbitration, the Article supports a broad 
reading of concerted activity, which would protect even individual 
invocation of statutory rights in judicial proceedings. But even if 
this interpretation of concerted activity is not accepted, as under the 
current Board view, a requirement of waiver may well interfere with 
concerted activity. In the final sections, which review the 
Hodges, Arbitration of Statutory Claims in the Unionized Workplace: Is 
Bargaining with the Union Required?, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 513, 544-
56 (2001). 
7. See infra notes 34-62 and accompanying text; see also NLRB Chairman 
Gould, Speech on Alternative Dispute Resolution (Apr. 8, 1997), in 1997 DAILY 
LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 69, at E-3 to E-4 nn.15-17 (Apr. 10, 1997) (discussing cases 
on which the General Counsel issued complaints against employers for 
imposing arbitration agreements). 
8. See infra notes 63-64 and accompanying text. 
9. See O'Charley's Inc., No. 26-CA-19974, 2001 NLRB GCM LEXIS 25, at 
*2-3, 5, 9 (Apr. 16, 2001). 
10. References herein to compulsory or mandatory arbitration mean 
arbitration agreements that are required by employers as a condition of either 
obtaining or retaining employment. 
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application of Section 7 to compulsory arbitration agreements, the 
Article urges the General Counsel, the Board, and the courts to 
examine arbitration agreements and their effects to determine 
whether concerted activity, such as class actions, consolidated 
claims, and requests for broad injunctive relief, is barred. Given the 
state of current law on class actions, consolidation of claims, and 
broad injunctive relief in arbitration and the efforts of employers to 
use arbitration to bar such claims, arbitration agreements without 
express provisions permitting such concerted activity should be 
found unlawful and unenforceable because of their interference with 
Section 7 rights. 
IL EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION 
While arbitration of contractual grievances has been a fixture 
under collective bargaining agreements for many years, arbitration 
of employment law claims in the union and nonunion context is a 
relatively recent development. The growth of employment litigation 
and the expansion of the movement toward alternative dispute 
resolution have spurred employers to incorporate arbitration as a 
method of resolving employment claims.11 In Gilmer v. 
Interstate I Johnson Lane Corp., 12 the Supreme Court held that a 
securities broker's agreement to arbitration as a condition of 
registration on the New York Stock Exchange required him to 
arbitrate his claim under the Age Discrimination in Employment 
Act ("ADEA'').13 While recognizing that Congress could preclude 
waivers of the right to litigate under employment statutes, the 
Court found no evidence of such congressional intent under the 
ADEA. 14 Similarly, courts have found no congressional intent to 
preclude waiver of a judicial forum under Title Vll.15 Courts have 
11. Michael Z. Green, Debunking the Myth of Employer Advantage from 
Using Mandatory Arbitration for Discrimination Claims, 31 RUTGERS L.J. 399, 
399, 407 (2000) (citing the rise in the use of employment arbitration but arguing 
that arbitration is less favorable to employers than many suggest and offering 
reasons that employers should not impose blanket arbitration requirements on 
employees). 
12. 500 U.S. 20 (1991). 
13. Id. at 23. 
14. Id. at 24-26. 
15. See, e.g., EEOC v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton, & Scripps, 303 F.3d 994, 
1004 (9th Cir. 2002) (reversing the court's conclusion to the contrary in Duffield 
u. Robertson Stephens & Co., 144 F.3d 1182 (9th Cir. 1998)); Rosenberg v. 
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., 170 F.3d 1, 3 (9th Cir. 1999); 
Koveleskie v. SBC Capital Mkts., Inc., 167 F.3d 361, 365 (7th Cir. 1999); Seus v. 
John Nuveen & Co., 146 F.3d 175, 182 (3d Cir. 1998); Patterson v. Tenet 
Healthcare, Inc., 113 F.3d 832, 837 (8th Cir. 1997). 
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also ordered arbitration of many other federal statutory claims.16 
Where state employment law claims are the subject of arbitration 
agreements, the Federal Arbitration Act will preempt most state 
laws that attempt to restrict arbitration.17 
While Gilmer left open the question of whether arbitration 
agreements in employment contracts were enforceable under the 
Federal Arbitration Act, the Supreme Court resolved that issue in 
favor of enforceability in Circuit City Stores, Inc. u. Adams. 18 
Accordingly, there is a wide scope for arbitration of employment law 
claims and many employers have stepped in to mandate that 
employees agree to arbitrate all claims as a condition of 
employment. A review of the arbitration cases reveals that such 
well-known employers as Circuit City, Waffle House, Ryan's Steak 
16. See, e.g., Wikle v. CNA Holdings, Inc., No. 01-1119, 2001 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 8440, at *1, 3 (4th Cir. Apr. 23, 2001) (requiring employee to arbitrate 
Family Medical Leave Act ("FMLA") claim under collective bargaining 
agreement); Williams v. Imhoff, 203 F.3d 758, 767 (10th Cir. 2000) (requiring 
arbitration of ERISA claims, in agreement with Second, Third, Fifth, and 
Eighth Circuits); Johnson v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 148 F.3d 373, 374, 378-79 
(4th Cir. 1998) (ordering arbitration of claim under the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 
29 U.S.C. § 1981); Bercovitch v. Baldwin Sch., Inc., 133 F.3d 141, 150 (1st Cir. 
1998) (finding Americans with Disabilities Act does not preclude waiver of right 
to litigate); O'Neil v. Hilton Head Hosp., 115 F.3d 272, 274 (4th Cir. 1997) 
(finding nothing in FMLA precludes waiver of right to judicial remedies); 
Stewart v. Paul, Hastings, Janofsky & Walker, LLP, 201 F. Supp. 2d 291, 291, 
294 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (requiring arbitration of FMLA and disability 
discrimination claims); Adkins v. Labor Ready, Inc., 185 F. Supp. 2d 628, 646-
47 (S.D. W. Va. 2001) (ordering arbitration of Fair Labor Standards Act claim 
over objection of plaintiff), aff'd, 303 F.3d 496 (4th Cir. 2002); Horenstein v. 
Mortgage Mkt., Inc., No. 98-1104-AA, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22995, at *12 (D. 
Or. July 23, 1999) (same), aft'd, No. 99-36125, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 9267 (9th 
Cir. May 10, 2001). 
17. See Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 683 (1996) 
(preempting Montana statute requiring that an arbitration clause be "typed in 
underlined capital letters on the first page of the contract"); Allied-Bruce 
Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 268 (1995) (holding that the scope of the 
Federal Arbitration Act's ("FAA") coverage expanded with expansion of the 
commerce power and preempted Alabama statute that invalidated pre-dispute 
arbitration agreements); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492 (1987) (holding 
that the FAA preempted state law, which allowed judicial actions to collect 
unpaid wages despite any agreement to arbitrate the claim). For an example of 
a decision ordering arbitration of state law claims pursuant to the FAA, see 
Tupper v. Bally Total Fitness Holding Corp., 186 F. Supp. 2d 981, 985, 993 
(E.D. Wis. 2002) (ordering arbitration of plaintiffs' common law claims that 
their terminations violated implied contracts with the employer). 
18. 532 U.S. 105, 119 (2001) (interpreting the FAA's Section 1 exclusion for 
employment contracts to apply only to contracts of transportation workers). 
Circuit City involved allegations that the employer violated the California Fair 
Employment and Housing Act, as well as state law tort claims. Id. at 110. 
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House, Tenet Health Care, Hooter's, and O'Charley's have required 
their employees to agree to arbitrate all claims as a condition of 
employment.19 
Mandatory arbitration has been the subject of widespread 
criticism by academics.20 In addition, the plaintiffs' bar has mounted 
judicial challenges to arbitration agreements. While employment 
arbitration agreements have been widely enforced, 21 the Supreme 
19. EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 282-83 (2002); Circuit City 
Stores, Inc., 532 U.S. at 109-10; Floss v. Ryan's Family Steak Houses, Inc., 211 
F.3d 306, 309 (6th Cir. 2000); Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 935 
(4th Cir. 1999); Patterson v. Tenet Healthcare, Inc., 113 F.3d 832, 833-34 (8th 
Cir. 1997); O'Charley's, Inc., No. 26-CA-19974, 2001 NLRB GCM LEXIS 25, at 
*7 (Apr. 16, 2001). Notably, each of these employers hires many low wage 
employees, supporting the theory that arbitration is used to preclude claims by 
such employees who may be unable to afford arbitration. See also In re 
Halliburton Co., 80 S.W.3d 566, 557 (Tex. 2002) (upholding arbitration 
agreement imposed on employees by energy firm); Getting Veteran Workers to 
Sign Arbitration Pacts, 18 INDIVIDUAL EMP. RTS. 57 (2002) (noting comments by 
counsel for Valu, Inc., Dain Rauscher Corp., and United Healthcare Corp. 
regarding their companies' mandatory arbitration policies for current workers). 
20. For criticisms of mandatory arbitration, see Sarah Rudolph Cole, 
Incentives and Arbitration: The Case Against Enforcement of Executory 
Arbitration Agreements Between Employers and Employees, 64 UMKC L. Rev. 
449 (1996); Joseph R. Grodin, Arbitration of Employment Discrimination 
Claims: Doctrine and Policy in the Wake of Gilmer, 14 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 1, 1-3, 
44-55 (1996); Geraldine Szott Moohr, Arbitration and the Goals of Employment 
Discrimination Law, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 395, 456-59 (1999); David S. 
Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business: Employee and 
Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 
33; Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme 
Court's Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637, 660-63 (1996); 
Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Mandatory Arbitration of Individual Employment 
Rights: The Yellow Dog Contract of the 1990s, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 1017, 1036-
42 (1996). For contrary views, see Estreicher, Saturns for Rickshaws, supra 
note 5, at 562-63 (arguing that most employees will be better off in arbitration); 
Samuel Estreicher, Predispute Agreements to Arbitrate Statutory Employment 
Claims, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1344, 1349-51 (1997) [hereinafter Estreicher, 
Predispute Agreements]; St. Antoine, supra note 5, at 93 (suggesting that 
arbitration with appropriate protections for employees may be "the most 
realistic hope of the ordinary blue- or pink-collar claimant"); David Sherwyn et 
al., In Defense of Mandatory Arbitration of Employment Disputes: Saving the 
Baby, Tossing out the Bath Water, and Constructing a New Sink in the Process, 
2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 73 (1999). 
21. See, e.g., Seus v. John Nuveen & Co., 146 F.3d 175, 186 (3d Cir. 1998) 
(finding that ambiguous arbitration clause covered employment dispute in light 
of policy of favoring arbitration); Patterson v. Tenet Healthcare, Inc., 113 F.3d 
832, 835 (8th Cir. 1997) (finding employee bound by arbitration provision in 
handbook and acknowledgment form, although handbook contained disclaimer 
asserting that it was not a binding contract); Armijo v. Prudential Ins. Co. of 
Am., 72 F.3d 793, 798 (10th Cir. 1995) (finding that ambiguous arbitration 
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Court's arbitration jurisprudence has not foreclosed all avenues for 
challenge and courts have struck down some of the most egregious 
arbitration provisions.22 Courts have found unenforceable 
arbitration agreements that fail to specify the rules and procedures 
governing arbitration or are overwhelmingly favorable to the 
employer.23 In addition, employees can resist arbitration on the 
basis of "generally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, 
duress, or unconscionability."24 While fraud and duress have been 
difficult to establish,25 courts have found arbitration agreements 
unconscionable on various grounds. Some courts have refused to 
clause covered employment dispute in light of policy of favoring arbitration). 
22. Other avenues for challenging arbitration agreements exist as well. 
For a discussion of the possible arguments, see David S. Schwartz, Short-
Circuiting Employee Rights: Compelled Arbitration after Circuit City (2001) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the author). 
23. Dumais v. Am. Golf Corp., 299 F.3d 1216, 1219 (10th Cir. 2002) 
(refusing to enforce arbitration agreement where illusory because employer can 
alter the agreement at will); Murray v. United Food & Commercial Workers 
Int'l Union, Local 400, 289 F.3d 297, 304-05 (4th Cir. 2002) (refusing to enforce 
arbitration agreement as one-sided where, inter alia, employer had complete 
control over selection of panel from which arbitrator would be chosen); Penn v. 
Ryan's Family Steak Houses, Inc., 269 F.3d 753, 759-60 (7th Cir. 2001) (finding 
promise to arbitrate illusory where arbitration provider retains right to change 
rules without notice and thus, there was no consideration for promise to 
arbitrate); Floss, 211 F.3d at 315-16 (same); Hooters of Am., Inc., 173 F.3d at 
938 (refusing to compel employee to arbitrate because Hooters breached the 
agreement "by promulgating rules so egregiously unfair as to constitute a 
complete default of its contractual obligation to draft arbitration rules and to do 
so in good faith"). With respect to the rationale in the Ryan's cases, however, it 
is notable that lack of consideration was found because the employees' 
agreements were with the arbitration provider, not the employer. Had the 
agreement been with the employer, a different result might have been obtained. 
Penn, 269 F.3d at 760-61. 
24. Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996); see, e.g., 
Ferguson v. Countrywide Credit Indus., 298 F.3d 778, 785-86 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(finding unilaterally imposed arbitration agreement unconscionable where it 
required the employee to pay half of the costs, covered claims employers were 
likely to bring but excluded those employees were likely to bring, and contained 
discovery provisions favorable to the employer); Hendrix v. Countrywide Home 
Loans, Inc., No. B153848, 2002 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 6598, at *9-10 (Cal. Ct. 
App. July 17, 2002) (finding unconscionable and unenforceable arbitration 
agreement that covered claims employers were likely to bring but excluded 
those employees were likely to bring, required employees to pay half the cost of 
arbitration after the first hearing day, and allowed arbitrator to impose all costs 
on employees who lose claims). 
25. Simply because a contract is one of adhesion, which is descriptive of 
most employment arbitration agreements, does not mean that it was signed 
under duress and is thus invalid. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 
U.S. 20, 32-33 (1991). 
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enforce agreements which limit statutory remedies, while others 
have declined to require similar remedial schemes in arbitration.26 
Some courts have held that employees cannot be forced to share the 
cost of arbitration, while others have refused to strike down 
arbitration agreements requiring cost-sharing. 27 And, most relevant 
to the discussion that follows, some courts have permitted litigation 
of class claims where the arbitration agreement precludes class 
actions or makes no provision for them, while many courts have 
ordered arbitration even where the effect is to deprive the employees 
of the opportunity to litigate their claims as a class.28 Where claims 
are small, the effect of an order to arbitrate individually may well be 
to defeat the claim, for the cost of arbitration will exceed the 
potential recovery for each claimant. 29 
While the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
("EEOC") has consistently opposed mandatory arbitration,30 its 
opposition has not influenced courts to refrain from enforcing 
agreements to arbitrate discrimination claims. No court has yet 
addressed the issue of the impact of Section 7 of the NLRA on 
arbitration agreements. The issue has come before the NLRB's 
General Counsel and several administrative law judges, however.31 
Ill. THE NLRB'S POSITION ON COMPULSORY ARBITRATION 
At the outset, it is important to note that the NLRA covers only 
employees of private employers in interstate commerce, except for 
railroads and airlines.32 Excluded from the provisions of the Act are 
26. The Supreme Court has granted certiorari on the question of whether a 
court must compel arbitration where the agreement prohibits punitive damages 
that would be available in court, allowing the arbitrator to address the damages 
issue first. See Pacificare Health Sys., Inc. v. Book, 123 S. Ct. 409 (2002) 
(mem.). For lower court cases addressing the issue of damage limitations, 
compare Circuit City Stores, Inc. u. Adams, 279 F.3d 889 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding 
unconscionable an arbitration agreement imposed as a contract of adhesion 
which limited statutory remedies of plaintiff), and Paladino u. Avnet Computer 
Techs., Inc., 134 F.3d 1054, 1060, 1062 (11th Cir. 1998) (refusing to require 
arbitration where large fees imposed on employee and Title VII damages not 
available), with Gannon u. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 262 F.3d 677, 681-82 (8th 
Cir. 2001) (severing provision limiting punitive damages while enforcing 
agreement to arbitrate), and DeGaetano u. Smith Barney, Inc., No. 95 Civ. 1613, 
1996 WL 44226, at *5-6 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 5, 1996) (ordering arbitration despite 
limitations on Title VII damages). 
27. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
28. See infra notes 205-33 and accompanying text. 
29. See infra notes 230-33 and accompanying text. 
30. See Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, Mandatory Arbitration of 
Employment Discrimination Disputes as a Condition of Employment, 8 LAB. 
REL. REP. (BNA) 405:7511 (1997). 
31. See infra notes 32-62 and accompanying text. 
32. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (2000) (defining employer, excluding the 
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agricultural employees, domestic service workers, supervisors, 
managers, confidential employees, and independent contractors. 33 
Thus, even assuming that the Act imposes some limitations on 
compulsory arbitration for employees, there are a wide range of 
individuals excluded from the statute on whom employers could still 
impose arbitration agreements consistent with the National Labor 
Relations Act. 
A The General Counsel 
In 1995, the NLRB General Counsel, in response to a request 
for advice from an NLRB Regional Director, took the position in 
Bentley's Luggage Corp.,34 that mandatory arbitration agreements in 
the nonunion workplace violate the National Labor Relations Act.35 
The issue submitted for advice was whether the employer violated 
the Act by requiring employees, under threat of termination, to 
agree to arbitrate employment claims before seeking redress in any 
other forum. 36 The General Counsel authorized a complaint, absent 
settlement, alleging that the action violated Sections 8(a)(l) and (4) 
of the Act because it required the employees to waive their statutory 
right to file charges with the Board. The memorandum relied on the 
government and employers covered by the Railway Labor Act such as railroads 
and airlines); id. § 152(3) (defining employee); id. § 157 (establishing employee 
rights). 
33. Id. § 152(2) (also excluding employees of employers not covered by the 
statute); see id. § 152(11) (defining supervisor); NLRB v. Hendricks County 
Rural Elec. Membership Corp., 454 U.S. 170, 188-89 (1981) (excluding 
confidential employees, defined as those who assist labor relations managers 
with confidential information); NLRB v. Bell Aerospace, Inc., 416 U.S. 267, 289 
(1974) (excluding managerial employees), on remand, 219 N.L.R.B. 384, 385 
(1975) (defining managerial employees as "those who formulate and effectuate 
management policies" and "those who have discretion in the performance of 
their jobs independent of their employer's established policy"). 
34. No. 12-CA-16658, 1995 NLRB GCM LEXIS 92 (Aug. 21, 1995). 
35. Id. at *1. The General Counsel of the Board supervises the 
investigation, issuance, and prosecution of complaints for violation of the Act. 
29 U.S.C. § 153(d). The Division of Advice is one of the four main divisions of 
the General Counsel's office. JEFFREY A. NORRIS & MICHAEL J. SHERSHIN, JR., 
How TO TAKE A CASE BEFORE THE NLRB 37 (6th ed. 1992). In considering 
whether to issue a complaint on unfair labor practice charges involving novel, 
complex, or doubtful legal issues, Regional Directors may, and in some cases 
must, submit questions to the Division of Advice prior to decision on the charge. 
See NLRB Case Handling Manual,§ 11751.1; Memorandum GC 02-03 (Dec. 17, 
2001), at http://www.nlrb.gov/gcmemo/gc02-02.html. Unfair labor practice 
complaints are heard initially by administrative law judges and then reviewed 
by the five member Board. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c). 
36. Bentley's Luggage Corp., 1995 NLRB GCM LEXIS 92, at *l. 
2003] SECTION 7 RIGHTS 183 
early Supreme Court decision in National Licorice Co. u. NLRB,37 
which held that contracts used to frustrate statutory rights are 
unlawful. 38 The General Counsel noted that the Board has 
subsequently held that employers and unions violate the Act by 
insisting that employees waive either their right to file unfair labor 
practice charges or their right to use contractual grievance and 
arbitration procedures.39 Although the arbitration agreement in 
Bentley's could be read broadly to waive the right to pursue any 
statutory claim without arbitrating first, the focus of the General 
Counsel was on the waiver of the right to bring charges to the 
NLRB. Thus, the General Counsel asserted a violation of Section 
8(a)(4), which prohibits discrimination against employees for filing 
charges or giving testimony under the Act.40 The General Counsel 
reasoned that the provision was enacted to protect employee rights 
to report unfair labor practices, and the arbitration agreement 
interfered with that purpose.41 
The employer argued that the agreement was privileged by the 
Supreme Court's decision in Gilmer u. Interstate I Johnson Lane 
Corp.,42 but the General Counsel found the case inapplicable.43 
Gilmer does not permit an employer to enforce an agreement to 
arbitrate statutory claims where the statute evidences an intent to 
preclude waiver of judicial remedies.44 The General Counsel read 
the Act as providing enforcement authority to the Board regardless 
of other remedies available.45 Further, the General Counsel noted 
that the EEOC could pursue an age discrimination claim (the 
subject of the waiver in Gilmer) without the filing of a charge by the 
employee, but the Board has no such authority.46 Therefore, a 
waiver by the employee precludes enforcement of the NLRA.47 
37. 309 U.S. 350 (1940). 
38. Bentley's Luggage Corp., 1995 NLRB GCM LEXIS 92, at *6-7 (citing 
Nat'l Licorice Co., 309 U.S. 350 (1940)). 
39. Id. at *7-8; see also Constr. & Gen. Laborers, Local 304, 265 N.L.R.B. 
602, 602 (1982). 
40. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(4); Bentley's Luggage Corp., 1995 NLRB GCM LEXIS 
92, at *8. 
41. Bentley's Luggage Corp., 1995 NLRB GCM LEXIS 92, at *9-10. 
42. 500 U.S. 20 (1991). 
43. Bentley's Luggage Corp., 1995 NLRB GCM LEXIS 92, at *11 (citing 
Gilmer, 500 U.S. 20). 
44. Id. at *10-12 (quoting Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26). 
45. Id. at *13 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 160(a)). The General Counsel also noted 
that Gilmer involved enforcement of an arbitration agreement already signed, 
not whether an effort to obtain such an agreement was lawful. Id. at *13-14. 
46. Id. at *14. 
47. The Memorandum also noted that since the employees were at will, the 
arbitration agreement did not clearly provide a basis to challenge a termination 
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Because the rationale of the General Counsel concentrated on 
the NLRA and the right to file charges with the Board, the opinion 
offers limited guidance with respect to compulsory agreements to 
arbitrate other statutory claims. And since the case settled prior to 
trial, the Board itself never decided the issue.48 
Subsequent to Bentley's, the General Counsel continued to issue 
proscribed by the statute. Id. at *15. In addition, the General Counsel rejected 
the employer's claim that the agreement did not bar unfair labor practice 
charges, noting that given the six month statute of limitations and the 
requirement that employees not only refrain from initiating actions, but dismiss 
actions already commenced, the right to file charges after arbitration was 
illusory. Id. at *15-18. 
48. 1996 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 96 at D-15 (May 17, 1996). The case 
was settled based on the employer's agreement that it would no longer require 
the employees to arbitrate "as a condition to their filing a complaint with [the) 
NLRB or to the exercise of rights protected by the NLRA." Id. The General 
Counsel issued complaints in several other cases on the same theory, three of 
which have been decided by administrative law judges and one by the Board. 
See NLRB Chairman Gould, Speech on Alternative Dispute Resolution, supra 
note 7 (discussing other cases); see also infra notes 53-64 and accompanying 
text. The NLRB defers to arbitration under collective bargaining agreements 
where unfair labor practice claims and contract claims overlap, reserving 
jurisdiction to insure that the resolution is not repugnant to the statute. See 
Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. 837, 840 (1971). "The Board's authority, 
in its discretion, to defer to the arbitration process has never been questioned 
by the courts of appeals, or by the Supreme Court." Id. at 840. The deferral is 
discretionary, however: 
There is no question that the Board is not precluded from adjudicating 
unfair labor practice charges even though they might have been the 
subject of an arbitration proceeding and award. Section lO(a) of the 
Act expressly makes this plain, and the courts have uniformly so held. 
However, it is equally well established that the Board has 
considerable discretion to respect an arbitration award and decline to 
exercise its authority over alleged unfair labor practices if to do so will 
serve the fundamental aims of the Act. 
Id. at 840 (quoting Int'l Harvester Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 923, 925-26 (1962)); see 
also Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080, 1090 (1955) (finding that "[c)learly, 
agreements between private parties cannot restrict the jurisdiction of the 
Board. Therefore, we believe the Board may exercise jurisdiction in any case of 
an unfair labor practice when in its discretion its interference is necessary to 
protect the public rights defined in the Act"). It might be argued that the 
General Counsel's position in Bentley's Luggage is inconsistent with the deferral 
doctrine, so long as the employee is not prevented from filing a charge to invoke 
the Board's review of the arbitration decision. For arguments that the Board 
should permit mandatory arbitration in the nonunion context and review 
decisions and the fairness of arbitral procedures under the Spielberg doctrine, 
see Judith B. Sadler, ADR and the NLRA: Will the Board Defer?, 16 Omo ST. J. 
ON DISP. RESOL. 571 (2001); Tanya A. Yatsco, Comment, How About a Real 
Answer? Mandatory Arbitration as a Condition of Employment and the 
National Labor Relations Board's Stance, 62 ALB. L. REV. 257, 291 (1998). 
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complaints where arbitration agreements either explicitly or 
implicitly barred the employee from filing charges with the Board.49 
In 2001, however, two advice memoranda upheld mandatory 
arbitration agreements that expressly and unambiguously 
permitted filing of unfair labor practice charges, despite the 
agreement. 50 In the lengthier of the two memoranda the General 
Counsel opined, citing Gilmer, that denial of access to the courts 
restricted only the forum choice and did not limit substantive 
rights.51 Accordingly, the General Counsel found no interference 
with concerted activity.52 
B. Administrative Law Judge Opinions 
Three administrative law judges have found that unilaterally 
imposed arbitration agreements violate the statute. In Architectural 
Building Products, Inc.,53 Judge Charno reviewed an employer-
adopted mandatory arbitration procedure which specified that it 
applied to all disputes, and indicated that employees had to file a 
grievance within five days or lose the right to assert the claim before 
the Board or in any other forum. 54 The procedure imposed financial 
penalties on the employee who initiated litigation that was stayed or 
dismissed on motion of the employer.55 Judge Charno found that 
these provisions violated Sections 8(a)(l) and (4), and also found 
unlawful the employer's conditioning the reinstatement of two 
employees on the signing of the agreement to arbitrate.56 The judge 
relied on the restriction of access to the NLRB to find the procedure 
unlawful. 57 
Judge Schmidt addressed a similar arbitration provision in 
49. See W. & S. Food Servs., No. 14-CA-25948, 2000 NLRB GCM LEXIS 67, 
at *1-2 (June 13, 2000) (recommending complaint where agreement waived the 
right to file charges with administrative agencies and where amended 
agreement preserved that right since other provisions conflicted with and, 
perhaps, negated the reservation ofrights). 
50. See Den-Tex Cent., Inc., No. 14-CA-26491, 2001 NLRB GCM LEXIS 34, 
at *1 (Aug. 24, 2001); O'Charley's Inc., No. 26-CA-19974, 2001 NLRB GCM 
LEXIS 25, at *5 (Apr. 16, 2001). 
51. O'Charley's, 2001 NLRB GCM LEXIS 25, at *9-13. 
52. Id. at *12-13. The General Counsel relied solely on the text of the 
arbitration provision and did not address the issue of whether it could be 
applied to restrict concerted activity. Id. at *12 & n.16. 
53. No. 17-CA-19326, 1998 NLRB LEXIS 541(July28, 1998). 
54. Id. at *8. 
55. Id. 
56. Id. at *13, 16. The two employees were reinstated pursuant to a 
settlement in a prior unfair labor practice proceeding. Id. at *9. 
57. Id. at *8, 17 app. C. 
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Bill's Electric, Inc. 58 Like Judge Charno, Judge Schmidt found that 
the grievance and arbitration procedure, which required all 
employees to submit all disputes and penalized them with costs and 
attorneys fees for bypassing the procedure, violated Section 8(a)(l).59 
In rejecting the employer's argument that the procedure was 
consistent with the Board's deferral policy, the judge noted that the 
arbitration system extended to every legal right, and contained no 
Board review mechanism, far exceeding the scope of the deferral 
policy.60 The analysis, however, like the analysis in Architectural 
Building Products, Inc., focused largely on the interference with 
access to the Board. The third case was Exceptional Professional, 
Inc.,61 which was decided by the Board and thus is addressed 
below.62 
C. TheBoard 
The Board has addressed the issue in only one case, Exceptional 
Professional, Inc.63 Although the judge in the case found that the 
employer maintained a mandatory grievance procedure in violation 
of Sections 8(a)(l) and (4), the Board concluded that the evidence 
was insufficient to establish that the grievance procedure was 
mandatory or that it had been communicated to the employees.64 
Thus, the Board found no violation, never addressing the question of 
whether a mandatory procedure would violate the Act. 
Although the rationale of the General Counsel and the 
administrative law judges relating to the restriction of Board access 
is persuasive, the absence of a Board ruling limits the utility of the 
decisions. In addition, the only analysis addressing the impact of 
the Act on compulsory arbitration of other claims, such as 
discrimination, minimum wage, and overtime, or even contract 
claims, is the several paragraphs in the O'Charley's Advice 
Merrwrandum65 arguing that an agreement to arbitrate is a 
restriction of forum choice only, not of substantive legal rights.66 A 
more thorough analysis of the applicability of the concerted activity 
protections in the Act is necessary. In determining how the Act 
might apply to such situations, it is important first to look at the 
58. Nos. 17-CA-18629-1, 17-CA-18697, 17-CA-18787, 17-CA-19112, 1999 
NLRB LEXIS 572, at *25-27 (Aug. 10, 1999). 
59. Id. at *41. 
60. Id. at *42. 
61. 336 N.L.R.B. No. 16 (Sept. 28, 2001). 
62. See infra notes 63-65 and accompanying text. 
63. 336 N.L.R.B. No. 16. 
64. Id. at *8. 
65. 2001 NLRB GCM LEXIS 25 (Apr. 16, 2001). 
66. See supra note 51 and accompanying text. 
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issue of what is concerted activity for mutual aid and protection, 
which the Act was designed to protect. 
IV. CONCERTED ACTIVITY FOR MUTUAL AID AND PROTECTION 
Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act protects the rights 
of individuals to engage in union activity and "to engage in other 
concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other 
mutual aid or protection .... "67 The courts and the Board have read 
this provision as having two requirements for protection.68 First, the 
activity must be concerted, and second, it must be for purposes of 
mutual aid and protection. The first requirement deals with the 
manner in which the activity is undertaken, specifically whether it 
is "in concert,'' and the second deals with the subject matter or 
purpose of the activity. 
A The Requirement of Concert 
When two or more employees act together in a group or "in 
concert,'' it is clear that the activity is "concerted." In its most 
recent, thorough analysis of the interpretation of concerted activity, 
the Board in Meyers Industries, Inc. (Meyers I/)69 stated that only 
"group" activity was protected.70 In addition to activity clearly 
undertaken by several employees acting together,71 group activity 
includes activity by an individual which seeks to initiate or invoke 
group activity, or activity by an individual who brings a group 
complaint to the attention of management. 72 The Meyers cases are 
part of a long line of cases in which the Board and the courts have 
grappled with the question of when individual activity is concerted. 
A review of the history of this issue will aid in the determination of 
67. 29 u.s.c. § 157 (2000). 
68. See Meyers Indus., Inc., 281 N.L.R.B. 882, 884 (1986), enforced sub 
nom. Prill v. NLRB, 835 F.2d 1481 (D.C. Cir. 1987) [hereinafter Meyers II]. 
69. Meyers II, 281 N.L.R.B. 882. 
70. Id. at 886. 
71. See NLRB v. Wash. Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 12-14 (1962) (finding 
that seven employees who walked off their jobs without permission to protest 
the temperature in the shop were engaged in protected concerted activity under 
Section 7); Shell Oil Co. v. NLRB, 561 F.2d 1196, 1197 (5th Cir. 1977) (enforcing 
Board decision, finding that two employees who assembled coworkers to meet 
with supervisors regarding complaints about working conditions were engaged 
in protected concerted activity); Columbia Univ., 236 N.L.R.B. 793, 793 (1978) 
(finding that two employees who discussed working conditions and the need for 
a grievance committee among themselves and with other employees and spoke 
to their supervisor regarding the concerns were engaged in protected concerted 
activity). 
72. Meyers II, 281 N.L.R.B at 887. See further discussion of cases following 
Meyers II, infra notes 114-20 and 125-34 and accompanying text. 
188 WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38 
when lawsuits to enforce statutory or contractual rights constitute 
concerted activity. 
Initially, the Board recognized as concerted individual activity 
to enforce a collective bargaining agreement. 73 The Board concluded 
that such activity was concerted because it was enforcing 
contractual rights which applied to all employees and were a 
product of the employees' concerted action.74 That interpretation 
was approved by the Supreme Court in NLRB u. City Disposal 
Systems, Inc. 75 The Board has also held that activity by one 
individual, who has consulted with other employees who share her 
interests and speaks on their behalf, is concerted. 76 Thus, where 
several employees discuss the employer's discriminatory practices 
and authorize one of them to speak to the employer about the 
group's concerns, the spokesperson is engaged in concerted activity 
although the complaint is made individually. 
In the 1970s, the Board expanded its view of concerted activity 
in AUeluia Cushion Co., 77 recognizing that individual complaints to 
enforce statutory rights were concerted and therefore protected by 
the statute. 78 The Board presumed that other employees were 
interested in the conditions complained of and consented to the 
protest.79 In addition, the Board reasoned that the statutes 
pursuant to which the employee complained were themselves the 
product of employees' protected concerted activity in lobbying for 
statutory protection. 80 Subsequent to AUeluia Cushion, the Board 
found individual employee complaints relating to discrimination to 
be protected concerted activity.81 The Board's rationale in these 
73. See Bunney Bros. Constr. Co., 139 N.L.R.B. 1516, 1519 (1962). This 
doctrine became known as the Interboro doctrine. Interboro Contractors, Inc., 
157 N.L.R.B. 1295, 1298 (1966), enforced, 388 F.2d 495 (2d Cir. 1967). 
74. Interboro Contractors, Inc., 157 N.L.R.B. at 1298; Bunney Bros. Constr. 
Co., 139 N.L.R.B. at 1519. 
75. 465 U.S. 822, 831 (1984). 
76. See Meyers II, 281 N.L.R.B. at 886. 
77. 221 N.L.R.B. 999 (1975). 
78. Id. at 1000 (involving complaint to government agency about health 
and safety conditions in the workplace). 
79. Id. 
80. Id. 
81. See Hotel & Rest. Employees Union Local 28, 252 N.L.R.B. 1124, 1124 
(1980) (finding union employer violated the Act by terminating business agent 
for individually filing charges with the California Fair Employment Practices 
Commission alleging sex discrimination); Gen. Teamsters Local Union No. 528, 
237 N.L.R.B. 258, 258 n.1 (1978) (finding union violated the Act by removing an 
employee from his position as alternate steward because he filed race 
discrimination charges with the EEOC); Dawson Cabinet Co., 228 N.L.R.B. 290, 
290-92 (1977), enforcement denied, 566 F.2d 1079 (8th Cir. 1977) (finding 
employee terminated for refusing to work a job unless she was given equal pay 
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cases followed that of AUeluia Cushion, i.e., that employees acting 
alone to vindicate rights statutorily provided to all employees are 
engaged in concerted activity.82 
In 1984, however, the Board reversed its position on this issue 
in Meyers I,83 holding that an employee's complaint about the safety 
of a truck, that he and other drivers were required to drive, was 
unprotected because the statute precluded a determination that 
individual activity was protected. 84 The court of appeals reversed 
the Board's decision that the statute required the conclusion that 
individual activity was unprotected, finding the decision 
inconsistent with the Act as interpreted by the Supreme Court in 
City Disposal.85 The court of appeals read City Disposal as imposing 
on the Board the responsibility for determining the scope of 
protected activity, within the wide range of permissible 
interpretations of the statute.86 On remand, the Board accepted the 
court's conclusion that the Act did not require the conclusion it 
reached in Meyers I, but retained its position that the activity was 
not protected.87 On subsequent review, the court affirmed the 
Board's interpretation as a permissible interpretation of the 
statute.88 
The Board reasoned in Meyers II that the purpose of the Act was 
to protect collective activity, not individual activity.89 Further, the 
Board relied on City Disposal to find that both the purpose of the 
activity, i.e., for "mutual aid or protection,"90 and the element of 
concert were required in order for activity to be protected.91 The 
Board held that the AUeluia Cushion rationale eliminated the 
requirement of concert and focused only on whether the activity was 
undertaken for mutual aid and protection, assuming concert if that 
to men engaged in protected activity). The employee and another employee had 
filed charges alleging a violation of the Equal Pay Act, which the employer was 
aware of, but there was no evidence the employer was aware of her role in filing 
charges. Nevertheless, the Board found her activity protected as part of her 
ongoing effort to vindicate the rights of female employees. Id. 
82. See Hotel & Rest. Employees Union Local 28, 252 N.L.R.B. at 1124; 
Gen. Teamsters Local Union No. 528, 237 N.L.R.B. at 258 n.1. 
83. Meyers Indus., Inc., 268 N.L.R.B. 493 (1984) [hereinafter Meyers I]. 
84. Id. at 493, 498. 
85. Prill v. NLRB, 755 F.2d 941, 952-53 (D.C. Cir. 1985) [hereinafter Prill 
I]. 
86. Id. at 952. 
87. Meyers II, 281 N.L.R.B. 882, 882 (1986). 
88. Prill v. NLRB, 835 F.2d 1481, 1482 (D.C. Cir. 1987) [hereinafter Prill 
II]. 
89. Meyers II, 281 N.L.R.B. at 883. 
90. 29 u.s.c. § 157 (2000). 
91. Meyers II, 281 N.L.R.B. at 885. 
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element of the test were met.92 Thus, the Board concluded that only 
"group" activity was protected. 93 In response to concerns expressed 
by the court of appeals in Prill I,94 however, the Board in Meyers II 
reconciled its decision with prior Board precedent ''by emphasizing 
its intent to protect 'individual employees [who] seek to initiate or to 
induce or to prepare for group action' and 'individual employees 
bringing truly group complaints to the attention of management."'95 
Although Meyers has not been overruled, its viability has been 
questioned by some members of the Board,00 and some courts have 
also criticized the doctrine. '51 
The meaning of concerted activity adopted in Alleluia Cushion 
comports with the primary purpose of the NLRA. The Act was 
designed to protect employees who attempt to improve their working 
conditions.98 In their seminal article regarding the interpretation of 
concerted activity, Professors Gorman and Finkin persuasively 
argue that the Act protected concerted activity, not to the exclusion 
of individual activity, but rather to protect organized labor from the 
conspiracy doctrines applied by the courts to enjoin, as unlawful, 
concerted activity that would have been lawful if undertaken 
individually.99 Gorman and Finkin state: "The assumption of the 
Act was not that action which should be protected when engaged in 
by a group should be left unprotected when engaged in by the 
individual, but that lawful individual action should not become 
unlawful when engaged in collectively."100 
92. Id. at 884. 
93. Id. at 885-86. 
94. Prill v. NLRB, 755 F.2d 941 (D.C. Cir. 1985). 
95. Prill II, 835 F.2d 1481, 1484 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (alteration in original) 
(quoting Meyers II, 281 N.L.R.B. at 887). For further discussion about 
individual activity that remains currently protected by the Act, see infra notes 
112-36 and accompanying text. · 
96. In Aroostook County Regional Ophthalmology Center, Chairman Gould 
and Member Browning refused to rely on Meyers II. 317 N.L.R.B. 218, 220 n.12 
(1995), enforcement denied in relevant part, 81 F.3d 209 (D.C. Cir. 1996); see 
also Myth, Inc., 326 N.L.R.B. 136, 136 (1998) (Gould, Chairman, dissenting) 
(arguing against the Meyers II theory of concerted activity). 
97. See, e.g., Ewing v. NLRB, 861 F.2d 353, 355 (2d Cir. 1988). 
98. See Myth, Inc., 326 N.L.R.B. at 136. 
99. See Robert A Gorman & Matthew W. Finkin, The Individual and the 
Requirement of"Concert" Under the National Labor Relations Act, 130 U. PA. L. 
REV. 286, 335-36 (1981). Professors Gorman and Finkin thoroughly trace the 
history of Section 7 and its underlying policy, and conclude that it was designed 
to protect both individual and collective activity addressed to improving terms 
and conditions of employment. Id. at 331-46. 
100. Id. at 336. Other commentators have agreed with Gorman and Finkin. 
See, e.g., Christina A Karcher, The Supreme Court Takes One Step Forward 
and the NLRB Takes One Step Backward: Redefining Constructive Concerted 
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As Chairman Gould noted in his dissent in Myth, Inc., 101 it is 
particularly important in this era, when most employees are 
nonunion, for the Board to interpret Section 7 to protect the rights of 
employees who attempt to improve their working conditions, 
whether the efforts be through a direct approach to their employer 
or by enforcing other statutory protections. 102 Any other 
interpretation results in protection of the individual employee 
asserting a contractual right to be free from discrimination, but no 
Section 7 protection for the individual employee asserting a 
statutory right to be free from discrimination. 103 Since Section 7 
rights are protected "not for their own sake but as an instrwnent of 
the national labor policy,"104 they should be broadly construed to 
preserve employee rights to effectuate statutory objectives enacted 
by Congress. 
As the Supreme Court recognized in City Disposal, the collective 
bargaining agreement is a product of the employees' concerted 
activity, and the individual's assertion of contractual rights is an 
essential part of the concerted activity.105 Similarly, most employee 
protective statutes are a result of the concerted activity of unions 
and employees in many workplaces.106 Like the employee asserting 
contractual rights, the individual employee's assertion of statutory 
rights, through the filing of a charge or a lawsuit, is part and parcel 
of the concerted activity that led to enactment of the statute.107 
Finally, as Chairman Gould has noted, making employee rights 
dependent on the nature of the relationship to group action is a trap 
for the unwary employee and adds needless complexity to the 
enforcement of statutory rights, utilizing scarce agency resources for 
Activities, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1295, 1309 (1985); Staughton Lynd, The Right to 
Engage in Concerted Activity After Union Recognition: A Study of Legislative 
History, 50 IND. L.J. 720, 727-34 (1975); Thomas M. Mengler, Individual Rights 
for Organized and Unorganized Employees Under the National Labor Relations 
Act, 58 TEX. L. REV. 991, 1006-08 (1980). 
101. 326 N.L.R.B. 136. 
102. Id. at 140 (Gould, Chairman, dissenting). 
103. Id. at 141 (citing Prill I, 755 F.2d 941, 957 (D.C. Cir. 1985)). Although 
employees may be protected from retaliation by the discrimination statutes, 
that is not the case for all employment statutes. Id. Moreover, the Board's 
authority to remedy unfair labor practices is not affected by the availability of 
other remedies. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (2000). 
104. Emporium Capwell Co. v. W. Addition Cmty. Org., 420 U.S. 50, 62 
(1975). 
105. NLRB v. City Disposal Sys., Inc., 465 U.S. 822, 831-32 (1983). 
106. Alleluia Cushion Co., 221 N.L.R.B. 999, 1000 (1975), overruled by 
Meyers I, 268 N.L.R.B. 493. 
107. Id. 
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wasteful litigation.108 The employee who consults with other 
employees before speaking on their behalf is protected, while the 
employee who asserts the rights of all employees without such 
consultation is not. 109 The sophisticated employee who obtains 
advice from a lawyer or union representative will be protected, while 
those who act without such advice may lack protection for the same 
activity of enforcing statutory rights.110 In addition, as Professors 
Gorman and Finkin have argued, this interpretation of concerted 
activity makes protection dependent on whether the employer knew 
that the individual was acting with the support of other employees, 
an anomalous result with little support in the purposes and policies 
of the Act or in the interests of employers. 111 
Although individual activity to enforce statutory obligations is 
not protected under current Board doctrine, it is clear that 
individual activity which seeks to initiate group action is protected 
as concerted. In Meyers II, the Board stated: 
In Meyers I we noted with approval Root-Carlin, Inc., 92 
NLRB 1313, 1314 (1951), a decision antedating Meyers I by 33 
years, in which the Board recognized that: "Manifestly, the 
guarantees of Section 7 of the Act extend to concerted activity 
which in its inception involves only a speaker and a listener, 
for such activity is an indispensable preliminary step to 
employee self-organization."112 
In Circle K Corp., 113 the employee spoke twice with a fellow 
employee about working conditions and sought his support to 
improve them.114 She also wrote a letter soliciting the support of 
other employees.115 The employee whose support she sought 
declined to assist her and refused her request to sign the letter .116 
The Board found the employee's activity concerted because it 
solicited group action, even though her fellow employees declined to 
participate, and evidence indicated that some thought her motive 
108. Myth, Inc., 326 N.L.R.B. at 141 (Chairman Gould, dissenting). 
109. Meyers I, 268 N.L.R.B. 493, 497 (1984), aff d sub nom. Prill II, 835 F.2d 
1481 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
110. Myth, Inc., 326 N.L.R.B. at 141 (Chairman Gould, dissenting). 
111. See Gorman & Finkin, supra note 99, at 348-53. 
112. Meyers II, 281 N.L.R.B. 882, 887 (1986); accord Vought Corp., 273 
N.L.R.B. 1290, 1294 (1984) (finding employee's discussion of rumor regarding 
racial discrimination by employer concerted), enforced, 788 F.2d 1378 (8th Cir. 
1986). 
113. 305 N.L.R.B. 932 (1991), enforced, 989 F.2d 498 (6th Cir. 1993). 
114. Id. at 932. 
115. Id. 
116. Id. 
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was to protect herself from termination for poor performance.117 
In Compuware Corp. v. NLRB, 118 the Sixth Circuit Court of 
Appeals enforced the Board's decision that an employee was 
engaged in concerted activity where other employees shared his 
concerns, although he was the only employee who threatened to 
speak to the company's client about the concerns. 119 Although there 
was no evidence that any employee authorized the discharged 
employee to share their concerns with management, and indeed two 
employees testified that they had not authorized such 
representation, the court agreed with the Board that no such 
authorization was necessary.120 A similar result was reached in 
NLRB v. Guernsey-Muskingum Electric Co-operative, Inc. 121 The 
employees, unhappy because a foreman unfamiliar with their job 
was chosen from outside of their ranks, discussed complaining to a 
member of the Board of Trustees of the Cooperative.122 
Subsequently three employees individually complained to the board 
member and one was terminated.123 The Court of Appeals upheld 
the Board's finding of concerted activity, stating: 
The mere fact that the men did not formally choose a 
spokesman or that they did not go together to see [the board 
member] does not negative concert of action. It is sufficient to 
constitute concert of action if from all of the facts and circum-
stances in the case a reasonable inference can be drawn that 
the men involved considered that they had a grievance and de-
cided, among themselves, that they would take it up with 
124 
management. 
Where an individual acts as a union representative or 
spokesperson, the activity is also protected. 125 In Tradesmen 
International, 126 the Board found that an individual who testified at 
a hearing relating to an employer's surety bond was engaged in 
concerted activity because he testified as a representative of the 
117. Id. at 933. 
118. 134 F.3d 1285 (6th Cir. 1998). 
119. Id. at 1287. 
120. Id. at 1288-89 (citing NLRB v. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co., 651 F.2d 442, 
445 (6th Cir. 1981)). 
121. 285 F.2d 8, 12 (6th Cir. 1960). 
122. Guernsey-Muskingum Elec. Coop., Inc., 124 N.L.R.B. 618, 618 n.1 
(1959). 
123. Id. 
124. Guernsey-Muskingum, 285 F.2d at 12. 
125. See Tradesmen Int'l, Inc., 332 N.L.R.B. No. 107, at* 2-3 (Oct. 31, 2000), 
enforcement denied, 275 F.3d 1137 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 
126. Id. 
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union.127 The individual was a union organizer, but also had applied 
to work for the employer and was refused because of his testimony 
relating to the surety bond. 128 Noting that the complaint regarding 
the surety bond was an effort to level the playing field for union 
contractors, the Board stated that ''when an individual assists a 
union, or engages in union-related activity, by definition he is 
engaged in concerted activity."129 Where the employee is acting in 
furtherance of the interests of the union and its constituents, the 
activity is concerted even though it is done alone. 130 
Individual activity which constitutes either a continuation of, or 
an outgrowth of, prior concerted activity also is protected. For 
example, in Mobil Oil Exploration & Producing U.S., Inc., 131 the 
Board found that an employee who told coworkers that the employer 
had an investigator after him, and was trying to fire him for his 
efforts to "right a wrong," was engaged in protected concerted 
activity.132 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit agreed, noting 
that the employee had previously joined with other employees to 
complain about an agreement between the employer and the union, 
and subsequently complained individually to the company about 
activities of the union president. 133 Thus, his statement about his 
fear of termination was "either a continuation of earlier concerted 
activities or a logical outgrowth of concerted activity'' and therefore 
protected.134 
Employees who support the efforts of other employees to 
improve working conditions are also engaged in concerted activity, 
even where they act individually. In KPRS Broadcasting Corp., 135 
127. Id. at *2. 
128. Id. at *1. 
129. Id. at *2. 
130. Id. at *2 & n.4; see also Spartan Equip. Co., 297 N.L.R.B. 19, 19 (1989) 
(finding concerted, individual employee's filing of criminal charge against 
employer because he was attempting to further his efforts to act as union 
spokesperson without intimidation by the employer); Pete O'Dell & Sons Steel 
Erectors, 277 N.L.R.B. 1358, 1359 (1985) (finding concerted employee 
cooperation with investigation of Davis-Bacon Act complaint filed by the union 
because the employee acted to assist the union), enforced, 803 F.2d 1181 (4th 
Cir. 1986). 
131. 325 N.L.R.B. 176 (1997), enforced, 200 F.3d 230 (5th Cir. 1999). 
132. Id. at 177-79; see also Mike Yurosek & Son, Inc., 306 N.L.R.B. 1037, 
1038 (1992) (finding individual refusals to work overtime, which followed 
concerns over a schedule change expressed by the group, to be logical outgr0wth 
of concerted activity), enforced, 53 F.3d 261 (9th Cir. 1995). 
133. Mobil Exploration & Producing U.S., Inc. v. NLRB, 200 F.3d 230, 235 
(5th Cir. 1999). 
134. Id. at 241. 
135. 181 N.L.R.B. 535 (1970). 
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for example, the Board found that an employee who expressed 
support for a resolution introduced at a stockholders meeting 
seeking reinstatement of an employee who had tried to improve 
working conditions was engaged in protected concerted activity.136 
Accordingly, even under the narrower Board interpretation of 
Meyers Industries, there is much individual activity that is protected 
as concerted. 
B. Mutual Aid and Protection 
In Eastex, Inc. u. NLRB, 137 the Supreme Court addressed the 
scope of the statutory protection for concerted activity for "mutual 
aid and protection."138 In Eastex, the employer denied the union 
permission to distribute a leaflet to the employees, and the union 
alleged that the employer interfered with the employees' Section 7 
rights in violation of Section S(a)(l).139 The court described the 
contents of the leaflet as follows: 
The first and fourth sections [of the leaflet] urged employees to 
support and participate in the union and, more generally, 
extolled the benefits of union solidarity. The second section 
encouraged employees to write their legislators to oppose 
incorporation of the state "right-to-work" statute into a revised 
state constitution then under consideration, warning that 
incorporation would "weake[n] Unions and improv[e] the edge 
business has at the bargaining table." The third section noted 
that the President recently had vetoed a bill to increase the 
federal minimum wage from $1.60 to $2.00 per hour, compared 
this action to the increase of prices and profits in the oil 
industry under administration policies, and admonished: "As 
working men and women we must defeat our enemies and 
elect our friends. If you haven't registered to vote, please do so 
today."140 
The Court first rejected the employer's argument that the 
protection of Section 7 was limited to activities relating to the 
employees' employment relationship, noting that it was contrary to 
the language and longstanding interpretation of the Act as 
136. Id. at 535-36; see also Hotel & Rest. Employees & Bartenders Union, 
Local 28, 252 N.L.R.B. 1124, 1124 (1980) (stating that employee statements in 
support of employee who protested her lower pay, as compared to male 
employees, were protected). 
137. 437 U.S. 556 (1978). 
138. Id. at 556. 
139. Id. at 558. 
140. Id. at 559-60 (second and third alterations in the original) (quoting the 
News Bulletin to Local 801 Members, reprinted in id. at 576-78, app. 1). 
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protecting activity in support of employees of other employers.141 
The Court then addressed the contention that the use of "channels 
outside the immediate employer-employee relationship" was not 
protected under the statute.142 The Court stated: 
The 7 4th Congress knew well enough that labor's cause often 
is advanced on fronts other than collective bargaining and 
grievance settlement within the immediate employment 
context. It recognized this fact by choosing, as the language of 
§ 7 makes clear, to protect concerted activities for the 
somewhat broader purpose of "mutual aid or protection" as 
well as for the narrower purposes of "self-organization" and 
"collective bargaining." Thus, it has been held that the 
"mutual aid or protection" clause protects employees from 
retaliation by their employers when they seek to improve 
working conditions through resort to administrative and 
judicial forums, and that employees' appeals to legislators to 
protect their interests as employees are within the scope of 
this clause. To hold that activity of this nature is entirely 
unprotected-irrespective of location or the means employed-
would leave employees open to retaliation for much legitimate 
activity that could improve their lot as employees. As this 
could "frustrate the policy of the Act to protect the right of 
workers to act together to better their working conditions," ... 
we do not think that Congress could have intended the 
protection of§ 7 to be as narrow as petitioner insists. 143 
The Court went on to find the distribution of the leaflet to be 
protected, including both the section relating to the right to work 
law and the section relating to the minimum wage, noting that both 
could have an impact on the interests of the employees. 144 Thus, in 
accord with Eastex, judicial and administrative actions relating to 
terms and conditions of employment are protected, and the Board 
has so held. 145 The subjects of the legal actions at issue in 
mandatory arbitration cases are most often discrimination claims, 
but could also relate to health and safety, minimum wage and 
overtime pay or leave under the Family Medical Leave Act 
("FMLA"), for example. Each of these constitute subjects that relate 
directly to the employees' working conditions. 
Traditionally the Board has addressed issues of 
discrimination on the basis of race, gender, and ethnicity under the 
NLRA. Early on, both the Board and the courts read Section 
141. Id. at 564. 
142. Id. at 565. 
143. Id. at 565-67 (quoting NLRB v. Wash. Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 14 
(1962)). 
144. Id. at 570. 
145. See infra notes 151-61. 
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8(b)(l)(A) to encompass a duty of fair representation which 
precludes unions from discriminating in negotiations and the 
handling of grievances on the basis of race.146 The duty 
subsequently was extended to encompass discrimination on the 
basis of gender and ethnicity. 147 Dissenters have argued, to no avail, 
that the statute, and therefore, the duty of fair representation, was 
directed to discrimination on the basis of union activity, not other 
considerations.148 The Board and courts have also held that elections 
may be set aside where employers or unions impermissibly interject 
racial or ethnic issues into the organizing campaign in a way 
designed to inflame passions and preclude rational choice.149 These 
146. See infra note 148. 
147. See NLRB v. Local No. 106, Glass Bottle Blowers Ass'n, 520 F.2d 693, 
694-95 (6th Cir. 1975) (upholding Board's decision requiring two local unions 
segregated on basis of sex to merge and discontinue practice of segregating the 
handling of grievances based on sex, as it violated Section 8(b)(l)(A)); NLRB v. 
Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, Local No. 1581, 489 F.2d 635, 635-36 (5th Cir. 1974) 
(upholding Board's decision that union practice of negotiating preferences in 
hiring based on citizenship and residence of prospective employee's family 
violated Section 8(b)(l)(A)); Agosto v. Corr. Officers Benevolent Ass'n, 107 F. 
Supp. 2d 294, 305-06 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (denying summary judgment to union 
which offered no explanation for refusal to process sexual harassment claim, 
demonstrating that union may have committed sex discrimination in violation 
of Title VII and thereby breached its duty of fair representation); Seep v. 
Commercial Motor Freight, Inc., 575 F. Supp. 1097, 1104 (S.D. Ohio 1983) 
(stating that sex discrimination which violates Title VII may also breach the 
duty of fair representation, but finding no such discrimination in the case). 
148. See Indep. Metal Workers Union, Local No. 1, 147 N.L.R.B. 1573, 1588-
89 (1964) (McCulloch, Chairman, dissenting) (arguing that the Act bars only 
discrimination based on union activity, not race); Miranda Fuel Co., 140 
N.L.R.B. 181, 201 (1962) (arguing that the majority's wide interpretation of the 
scope of Section 8(b)(l)(A) was broader than the legislature intended), 
enforcement denied, 326 F.2d 172, 175 (2d Cir. 1963) (adopting view of Board 
dissent). Although enforcement was denied in Miranda Fuel Co., the courts 
have since upheld the Board majority's interpretation of Section 8(b)(l(A). See 
2 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 1886 (Patrick Hardin & John E. Higgens, Jr. 
eds., 4th ed. 2001) (explaining that since Miranda Fuel Co., courts have 
enforced the Board's interpretation of Section 8(b)(l)(A) as imposing a duty of 
fair representation); see also Bekins Moving & Storage Co., 211 N.L.R.B. 138, 
145-46 (1974) (Fanning and Penello, Members, dissenting) (arguing that 
withholding certification from a union based on the union's racial 
discrimination frustrated the purposes of the Act and that other statutory 
remedies for such discrimination, such as the Civil Rights Act, existed), 
overruled sub nom. Handy Andy, Inc., 228 N.L.R.B. 447, 448 (1977). The Board 
later reversed the policy announced in Bekins Mouing & Storage Co. See Handy 
Andy, Inc., 228 N.L.R.B. at 448 (concluding that the purposes of the NLRA were 
better effectuated when discrimination allegations were considered in unfair 
labor practices, rather than representation proceedings). 
149. See NLRB v. Katz, 701 F.2d 703, 709 (7th Cir. 1983) (denying 
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cases establish that the Board has viewed its statutory charter to 
protect the rights of employees broadly. 
Nondiscrimination clauses are mandatory subjects of 
bargaining150 and employee efforts to eliminate discrimination in the 
workplace have long been considered protected concerted activity.151 
enforcement of NLRB order to bargain where union campaign inflamed 
prejudice by focusing on religious and ethnic slurs and, thus, election should 
have been overturned); Sewell Mfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 66, 72 (1962) (setting 
aside election where employer used racial propaganda, including photos of a 
white union official dancing with a black woman and news articles connecting 
labor unions with integration and communism, in order to inflame the racial 
feelings of voters). But cf Case Farms, Inc. v. NLRB, 128 F.3d 841, 842-43 (4th 
Cir. 1997) (upholding Board decision ordering employer to bargain, and 
rejecting employer's objections based on union flyer accusing employer of firing 
Amish work force and hiring Latino work force because Latinos could be treated 
worse and paid less, as leaflet did not appeal to racial prejudice and therefore 
taint the election); NLRB v. Bancroft Mfg. Co., 516 F.2d 436, 440, 443-44 (5th 
Cir. 1975) (enforcing Board order that company bargain with union despite 
union campaign appealing to racial solidarity of African-American workers). 
150. See Harris-Teeter Super Mkts., Inc., 293 N.L.R.B. 743, 744 (1989) 
(mandating Union must be afforded opportunity to negotiate internal sexual 
harassment policy), enforced, 905 F.2d 1530 (4th Cir. 1990); Jubilee Mfg. Co., 
202 N.L.R.B. 272, 273-74 (1973) (affirming that employers must bargain in good 
faith concerning discrimination clauses, while finding that the employer did not 
resist bargaining in this case), affd sub nom. United Steelworkers v. NLRB, 
504 F.2d 271, 271 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
151. See Emporium Capwell Co. v. W. Addition Cmty. Org., 420 U.S. 50, 66 
(1975) (emphasizing that while collective bargaining to prevent discriminatory 
practice is a protected activity, employees may not circumvent the Union and 
engage in their own individual negotiating tactics to achieve non-discriminatory 
results); Gatliff Coal Co. v. NLRB, 953 F.2d 247, 251 (6th Cir. 1992) (affirming 
Board decision that two employees were unlawfully terminated for their 
concerted protest against gender-related harassment); United Packinghouse v. 
NLRB, 416 F.2d 1126, 1135 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (stating that workers have a right 
to engage in concerted activity to obtain "racially integrated working 
conditions"); Dearborn Big Boy No. 3, Inc., 328 N.L.R.B. 705, 710 (1999) (finding 
employees who urged another employee to file a lawsuit challenging the 
employer's refusal to hire her daughter as racially discriminatory engaged in 
protected concerted activity); Franklin Iron & Metal Corp., 315 N.L.R.B. 819, 
822 (1994) (finding employees who, after consultation with one another, 
separately approached employer about racially discriminatory wages and then 
went together to file separate charges with state anti-discrimination agency 
engaged in protected concerted activity), enforced, 83 F.3d 156 (6th Cir. 1996); 
Vought Corp., 273 N.L.R.B. 1290, 1294 (1984) (finding employee's discussion of 
rumor that white employee would be promoted over black employee was 
protected concerted activity), enforced, 788 F.2d 1378 (8th Cir. 1986); King 
Soopers, Inc., 222 N.L.R.B. 1011, 1018 (1976) (finding employee's filing of 
charges with the EEOC and the state civil rights agency protected); Tanner 
Motor Livery, Ltd., 148 N.L.R.B. 1402, 1402, 1411 (1964) (protecting concerted 
activity of employees protesting racially discriminatory hiring practices), 
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And, as noted above, the employees' activity need not be limited to 
dealing directly with the employer in order to be protected. 
Litigation in both administrative and judicial forums is protected as 
well. 152 Employees may lose protection, however, where the means 
chosen conflict with other provisions of the statute. In Emporium 
Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Organization, 153 the 
employees were not protected from termination for their concerted 
efforts to eliminate discrimination where they sought to do so by 
pressuring the employer to bypass the union representative and the 
negotiated grievance procedure, and bargain directly with the 
employees. 154 
Judicial and administrative action relating to other subjects has 
similarly been found protected.155 In Trinity Trucking & Materials 
Corp., 156 employees who filed a breach of contract lawsuit against 
their employer, seeking actual and punitive damages, were engaged 
in protected activity.157 In that case, the Board noted that filing a 
lawsuit is protected unless it was filed in bad faith, even where it is 
later found to be baseless.158 Concerted employee complaints to 
enforced in relevant part, 349 F.2d 1, 5 (9th Cir. 1965). 
152. Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 565 (1978); see also Franklin Iron 
& Metal Corp., 315 N.L.R.B. at 822 (finding employees who went together to file 
separate charges with state anti-discrimination agency were engaged in 
protected concerted activity); King Soopers, Inc., 222 N.L.R.B. at 1018 (finding 
employee's filing of charges with the EEOC and the state civil rights agency 
protected). 
153. 420 U.S. 50 (1975). 
154. Id. at 52. 
155. See, e.g., Altex Ready Mixed Concrete Corp. v. NLRB, 542 F.2d 295, 
296-97 (5th Cir. 1976) (finding two employees protected from termination for 
providing affidavits in connection with union's injunction action seeking to 
enforce collective bargaining agreement provision relating to loading of red dye 
into trucks); Tradesmen Int'l, Inc., 332 N.L.R.B. No. 107, at *2 (Oct. 31, 2000) 
(finding protected employee testimony before city board regarding payment of 
surety bond, since union was trying to level the playing field by insuring that 
nonunion companies did not compete unfairly with union companies by not 
complying with legal requirements), enforcement denied, 275 F.3d 1137 (D.C. 
Cir. 2002); Health Enters. of Am., Inc., 282 N.L.R.B. 214, 215 (1986) (finding 
filing of invasion of privacy lawsuit by group of employees against employer for 
alleged use of listening device in workplace to be protected concerted activity); 
Sarkes Tarzian, Inc., 149 N.L.R.B. 147, 153 (1964) (finding filing of libel suit 
against employer protected). 
156. Trinity Trucking & Materials Corp., 221 N.L.R.B. 364 (1975), 
supplemented, 227 N.L.R.B. 792 (1977), enforced without opinion, 567 F.2d 391 
(7th Cir. 1977). 
157. Id. at 365-66. 
158. Id. at 365; see also Garage Mgt. Corp., 334 N.L.R.B. No. 116, at *12 
(Aug. 3, 2001) (noting that complaints and grievances are protected regardless 
of merit so long as they are not filed in bad faith or with malice). 
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administrative agencies regarding health and safety issues have 
been found protected, 159 as have complaints to the Department of 
Labor, and legal actions relating to wage claims under the Fair 
Labor Standards Act and the Davis-Bacon Act. 160 
From the above discussion, it is clear that legal action, whether 
administrative or judicial, designed to redress complaints about 
wages, hours, or working conditions is for purposes of mutual aid 
and protection.161 Thus, concerted legal action is protected by the 
Act. The next section will examine the case law relating to employer 
and union requirements that employees waive their Section 7 rights. 
159. See Garage Mgt. Corp., 334 N.L.R.B. No. 116, at *12 (finding employee's 
filing of complaint with OSHA and notice of intent to cooperate with OSHA 
protected); Sys. with Reliability, Inc., 322 N.L.R.B. 757, 760 (1996) (finding 
protected employees' efforts to improve health and safety, including threat to 
contact OSHA); Wray Elec. Contracting, Inc., 210 N.L.R.B. 757, 762 (1974) 
(finding protected employee's filing of complaint with OSHA); Socony Mobil Oil 
Co., 153 N.L.R.B. 1244, 1248 (1965) (finding protected union official's complaint 
to the United States Coast Guard regarding unsafe operation of ship), enforced, 
357 F.2d 662 (2d Cir. 1966); Walls Mfg. Co., Inc., 137 N.L.R.B. 1317, 1318 
(1962) (finding employee's letter to health department complaining of 
unsanitary conditions in employer's restroom protected), enforced, 321 F.2d 753 
(D.C. Cir. 1963). 
160. See Salt River Valley Water Users' Ass'n v. NLRB, 206 F.2d 325, 328 
(9th Cir. 1953) (upholding Board conclusion that circulating petition giving 
employee power of attorney to represent employees in negotiation or legal 
action to recover pay due under Fair Labor Standards Act was protected); 52nd 
St. Hotel Assoc., 321 N.L.R.B. 624, 633 (1996) (stating that employees who ''.join 
together to seek legal redress for their wage claims" are engaged in protected 
concerted activity, citing a number of cases so holding); Triangle Tool & Eng'g, 
Inc., 226 N.L.R.B. 1354, 1357 (1976) (finding protected employee complaint to 
the Wage and Hour Division of the Department of Labor regarding overtime 
pay); see also Fredericksburg Glass and Mirror, Inc., 323 N.L.R.B. 165, 179 
(1997) (finding protected employee cooperation with governmental investigation 
regarding employer compliance with the Davis-Bacon Act requirement of 
payment of prevailing wages on federally funded projects); Williams 
Contracting, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. 433, 438 (1992) (finding protected employee 
threats to complain to the Indiana Department of Commerce in order to obtain 
appropriate wages); G.V.R., Inc., 201 N.L.R.B. 147, 153 (1973) (finding 
concerted and protected employee complaints about wages to Department of 
Labor and United States Army, with whom employer had contract requiring 
payment of certain wage rates). 
161. While most of the discussion herein has focused on federal employment 
laws, state employment laws relating to wages, hours, health and safety, leave, 
discrimination, and other terms and conditions of employment also may be the 
subject of concerted activity. Judicial action may be limited by arbitration 
agreements as well. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
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V. THE PROHIBITION ON CONDITIONING E:MPLOYMENT 
ON WAIVER OF SECTION 7 RIGHTS 
201 
Although some Section 7 rights can be waived, at least by the 
union, 162 the NLRB has long held that it is unlawful to condition 
employment on the waiver of employees' Section 7 rights. In Retlaw 
Broadcasting Co., 163 the employer, after terminating an employee, 
offered him reinstatement conditioned on waiver of his rights to file 
a grievance or seek union representation under the collective 
bargaining agreement to challenge any future termination.164 The 
Board adopted the administrative law judge's conclusion that this 
action violated Section 8(a)(l).165 In a number of similar cases, the 
Board, frequently affirmed by the courts, has found it unlawful to 
condition employment or reemployment on waiver of Section 7 
rights. 166 Even where an employee is "partially responsible for 
162. See Metro. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 460 U.S. 693, 707-08 (1983) (noting 
that the Supreme Court has long held that a union may waive statutory rights 
such as the right to strike). A waiver of a statutory right will not be lightly 
implied, however. See Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 283-84 
(1956). Such waivers are premised on the free choice of collective bargaining 
representative and the duty of fair representation. NLRB v. Magnavox Co., 415 
U.S. 322, 325 (1974). 
163. 310 N.L.R.B. 984 (1993), enforced, 53 F.3d 1002 (9th Cir. 1995). 
164. Id. at 984. 
165. Id. at 984, 993. 
166. See Teamsters Local Union No. 171 v. NLRB, 863 F.2d 946, 953 (D.C. 
Cir. 1988) (enforcing NLRB's decision that it was unlawful to condition 
reinstatement on the waiver of the right to strike in the future); Am. Cyanamid 
Co. v. NLRB, 592 F.2d 356, 364 (7th Cir. 1979) (enforcing NLRB's decision that 
it is unlawful to condition reinstatement on waiver of right to file unfair labor 
practice charges to challenge termination); Contractor Servs., Inc., 324 N.L.R.B. 
1254, 1255 (1997) (finding employer violated Act by requiring applicants to 
obtain union waiver of right to engage in protected union activity as a condition 
of employment); Great Lakes Chem. Corp., 298 N.L.R.B. 615, 624 (1990) 
(finding violation of Sections 8(a)(4) and (1) where employer conditioned 
employment on signing of a waiver of the legal right to bring any action against 
the company in the event of layoff or termination), enforced, 967 F.2d 624 (D.C. 
Cir. 1992); Prince, 283 N.L.R.B. 806, 808 (1987) (finding violation of Section 
8(a)(l) where employer conditioned recall of laid off employees on dropping of 
grievances under the collective bargaining agreement); A & D Davenport 
Transp., Inc., 256 N.L.R.B. 463, 463 n.2, 467 (1981) (finding violation where 
employer required employees to sign letter waiving Section 7 right to challenge 
their termination for concerted activity as a condition of reemployment), 
enforced, 688 F.2d 844 (7th Cir. 1982); Columbia Univ., 236 N.L.R.B. 793, 796 
(1978) (finding constructive discharge where employer unlawfully "conditioned 
[employee's] continued employment on her abstention from concerted 
activities ... ");John C. Mandel Sec. Bureau, Inc., 202 N.L.R.B. 117, 119 (1973) 
(finding violation where employee's reinstatement to job from which he was 
transferred was conditioned on withdrawal of unfair labor practice charges and 
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instigating'' an agreement to waive the right to engage in concerted 
activity as a condition of reinstatement, employer action is not 
privileged since "future rights of employees as well as the rights of 
the public may not be traded away in this manner."167 Where the 
matter involves reinstatement after termination, the Board has 
rejected employer arguments that conditions on reemployment are 
part of settlements of legal disputes.168 In a very recent case, the 
Board held that an employer that conditioned severance pay on an 
employee's agreement not to assist or communicate with the Board 
in the investigation and litigation of unfair labor practices violated 
the law, even though the employee was not otherwise entitled to 
severance pay.169 
The Board also has found unlawful employer policies which 
require employees to bring complaints to the employer before 
discussing them with others, including enforcement organizations 
and agencies, and unions.170 Similarly, employer rules which 
prohibit complaints regarding working conditions to third parties 
are unlawful.171 Thus, if the employer conditions employment on a 
agreement to refrain from future charges and from concerted activity, even 
where employee was "partially responsible for instigating this deal"); cf Halle 
Enters. Inc., v. NLRB, 247 F.3d 268, 273 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (finding offer of 
reinstatement after unlawful termination conditioned on waiver of right to 
participate in legal action against company did not toll back pay obligation); 
Oregon-Columbia Chapter of Nat'l Elec. Contractors Ass'n, Nos. 36-CA-7461, 
36-CA-7466, 36-CB-1962, 36-CB-1963, 2000 NLRB LEXIS 248, at *19-20 (Apr. 
21, 2000) (administrative law judge decision finding employer and union 
violated Sections 8(a)(l) and 8(b)(l)(A) respectively by maintaining a provision 
that required any employee/member who lost a legal proceeding brought 
against the employer or the union to pay the prevailing party's legal fees, since 
deterrent effect similar to waiver). 
167. John C. Mandel Sec. Bureau, 202 N.L.R.B. at 119. 
168. See Retlaw Broad. Co., 53 F.3d at 1007; see also Am. Cyanamid Co., 592 
F.2d at 363-64 (finding employer could not lawfully condition employees' return 
to work after unfair labor practice strike on signing settlement agreement 
waiving Section 7 rights). 
169. Metro Networks, Inc., 336 N.L.R.B. No. 3, at *5 (Sept. 28, 2001). 
Although the Board relied primarily on Section 8(a)(4), it noted that "[s]uch 
conduct unlawfully chills the Section 7 rights of all the employees." Id. 
Chairman Hurtgen concurred on the basis that the provision required the 
waiver of the employee's Section 7 right to assist other employees. Id. at *5 
n.20. 
170. See Kinder-Care Learning Ctrs., Inc., 299 N.L.R.B. 1171, 1171 (1990) 
(finding employer requirement that employees make complaints to the 
employer before approaching any other organization or agency with the 
complaint violated Section 8(a)(l)). 
171. See Compuware Corp. v. NLRB, 134 F.3d 1285, 1291 (6th Cir. 1998) 
(finding unlawful rule prohibiting employees from complaining to clients about 
working conditions). The court left open, however, the possibility that the 
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waiver of Section 7 rights, the employer violates Section 8(a)(l).172 
In addition to these precedents, the Supreme Court long ago 
held that individual contracts which purport to waive statutory 
rights are unlawful and unenforceable by the employer.173 In 
National Licorice Co. u. NLRB,174 the employer negotiated 
agreements with a committee representing the employees which 
gave the employees a raise in exchange for their agreement not to 
insist on a closed shop or a collective bargaining agreement and 
waived any right to arbitrate discharge claims. 175 Instead, the 
agreement, which was between the individual employee and the 
employer, provided an appeal to the employer of any discharge.176 
The Court upheld the Board's invalidation of the agreements 
because they restricted employee statutory rights, even though the 
waiver was made in negotiations and the employees received some 
benefit in exchange.177 Specifically, with respect to the discharge 
issue, the Court stated: ''The effect of this clause was to discourage, 
if not forbid, any presentation of the discharged employee's 
grievances to appellant through a labor organization or his chosen 
representatives, or in any way except personally."178 
Having examined these precedents, it is now possible to analyze 
how the Board and the courts should apply the law in the context of 
employment conditioned on agreement to arbitrate statutory claims. 
VI. APPLICATION OF BOARD LAW TO COMPULSORY 
ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS 
The above discussed precedents clearly establish a statutory 
right to engage in concerted activity to eliminate discrimination in 
the workplace or to redress other violations of workplace rights.179 It 
employer might establish a justifiable need to protect employer interests that 
outweighed the ancillary interference with concerted activity. Id. 
172. If the waiver restricts access to the Board, it also violates Section 
8(a)(4). See Great Lakes Chem. Corp., 298 N.L.R.B. 615, 622 (1990), enforced, 
967 F.2d 624 (D.C. Cir. 1992). 
173. Nat'l. Licorice Co. v. NLRB, 309 U.S. 350, 350 (1940). 
174. 309 U.S. 350. 
175. Id. at 360. 
176. Id. 
177. Id. at 359-60. 
178. Id. at 360. 
179. While the primary focus of the discussion here is on statutory 
discrimination claims since most cases have arisen in that context, the analysis 
would apply to other statutory rights as well, such as the right to be paid the 
minimum wage and overtime pay, the right to leave under the FMLA, and the 
right to file health and safety complaints with government agencies. See Fair 
Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (2000); Family Medical Leave Act, 
id. §§ 2601-2654 (2000); Occupational Safety and Health Act, id. §§ 651-678 
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is well-settled that administrative complaints and judicial action to 
enforce workplace statutory rights come within the definition of 
mutual aid and protection. The scope of concerted activity is more 
open to question, however. While the General Counsel in 
O'Charley's broadly suggested that the arbitration agreement there 
did not interfere with the right to engage in concerted activity, a 
more searching examination of arbitration agreements is necessary 
to ascertain their impact on concerted action. The sections that 
follow will analyze the impact of arbitration agreements on possible 
concerted activity. 
A Class Actions 
A class action lawsuit easily comes within the existing 
interpretation of concerted activity. Class actions are available 
under most federal employment law statutes. The class action, 
which enables litigation of multiple claims involving similar or 
identical questions of law in one forum, serves several purposes. It 
promotes judicial economy and efficiency by obviating the need to 
adjudicate the same issue repeatedly.180 In addition, the class action 
operates to afford a remedy to individuals where it is not 
economically feasible to obtain relief through an individual action, 
because each claim involves a small loss. 181 A group of plaintiffs can 
combine their resources to litigate against a defendant with 
significant legal and financial resources. 182 From the defendant's 
perspective, by allowing litigation of multiple claims in a single 
action, the class action both conserves resources and prevents 
inconsistent adjudications. 183 
Federal employment statutes provide two different models of 
class actions. Class actions under Title VII and several other 
statutes proceed under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
(2000). 
180. See Hoffmann-La Roche Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165, 170 (1989) 
(noting judicial economy of class action in ADEA claims); Sternlight, supra note 
3, at 29-30. 
181. See Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 339 (1980); Eisen 
v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 161 (1974) (stating that "[e]conomic 
reality dictates that petitioner's suit proceed as a class action or not at all"). 
182. See Hoffmann-La Roche Inc., 493 U.S. at 170 (stating that "[a] collective 
action allows age discrimination plaintiffs the advantage of lower individual 
costs to vindicate rights by the pooling of resources"); David T. Wiley, If You 
Can't Fight 'Em, Join 'Em: Class Actions Under Title I of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act, 13 LAB. LAW. 197, 204 (1997) (noting use of class actions under 
Title VII to combine resources to combat a defendant with greater resources). 
183. Ryan Patrick Phair, Resolving the "Choice-of-Law Problem" in Rule 
23(b)(3) Nationwide Class Actions, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 835, 837 (2000). 
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Procedure. 184 Rule 23 class actions are representative, allowing one 
or more individuals to bring the claim on behalf of all others, even 
where those class members have not filed charges with the 
administrative agency.185 Individual class members who do not opt 
out of the class action after notice are bound by the decision.186 The 
Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") sets forth a different structure 
for class claims, which also applies to class actions under the Equal 
Pay Act, the ADEA, and the FMLA.187 Under the FLSA, the 
requirements for certification are less stringent and no individual 
becomes a plaintiff without opting into the class, whereupon full 
party status is granted.188 
As noted above, some businesses impose arbitration agreements 
to eliminate the potential for class actions. The number of 
184. FED. R. CIV. P. 23. Claims under Title VII, the Americans with 
Disabilities Act ("ADA"), Section 1981, the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act ("ERISA"), and the Worker Adjustment and Retraining 
Notification Act (''WARN"), all proceed under Rule 23. See Albemarle Paper Co. 
v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 414-16 (1975) (recognizing class action for back pay 
under Title VII); Devine v. Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 989, 994-96 (D. 
Conn. 1991) (applying Rule 23 in ERISA claim); Cruz v. Robert Abbey, Inc., 778 
F. Supp. 605, 610-13 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) (applying Rule 23 in WARN Act claim), 
affd in part, rev'd in part, 34 F.3d 1148 (2d Cir. 1994); Morgan v. Laborers 
Pension Trust Fund, 81 F.R.D. 669, 675-82 (N.D. Cal. 1979) (applying Rule 23 
in ERISA claim); HAROLD S. LEWIS, JR. & ELIZABETH J. NORMAN, EMPLOYMENT 
DISCRIMINATION LAW AND PRACTICE§ 4.9 (2001) (discussing Title VII actions in 
federal courts). 
185. LEWIS & NORMAN, supra note 184, § 4.9. The Supreme Court has 
strictly applied the Rule 23 requirements for class certification. See Gen. Tel. 
Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157, 161 (1982). For certification, Rule 23 requires 
numerosity, commonality of questions of law or fact, representative claims 
typical of class claims, and fair and adequate representation by named 
plaintiffs. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). 
186. Rule 23(b)(3) specifically allows plaintiffs to opt out, while actions 
under Rules 23(b)(l) and (2) are mandatory. See FED. R. Crv. P. 23(b); see also 
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)-(3). Nevertheless, courts have permitted class members 
to opt out of Rule 23(b)(l) and 23(b)(2) classes under limited circumstances. 
LEWIS & NORMAN, supra note 184, § 12.30. 
187. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2000) (FLSA provision); id. § 206(d) (Equal Pay Act 
provision); id. § 626(b) (ADEA provision); id. § 2617(a)(2) (FMLA provision); see 
also C. Geoffrey Weirich & Barbara Berish Brown, Defending a Class Action, in 
1 29TH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 303, 306 (2000) (discussing opt-
in statutory class actions). 
188. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b); LEWIS & NORMAN, supra note 184, § 4.9. In 
addition, Section 216(b) claims involve a two-step certification process, with 
conditional certification for purposes of notice to prospective plaintiffs and 
discovery, followed by a reevaluation of class certification after discovery for 
trial purposes. Sudbury et al., Collective Actions, supra note 3, at 49-50. Rule 
23 class action certifications are completed in a single step. Id. at 49. 
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employment discrimination class actions filed has increased 
progressively since the passage of the 1991 Civil Rights Act, which 
provides for damages in cases involving intentional 
discrimination.189 In addition, class actions are increasing under the 
FLSA100 and ERISA 191 Class actions require expensive investigation 
189. William L. Kandel, An Appellate Boost for Employment Discrimination 
Class Actions, 25 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 79, 92 n.1 (2000) (noting an increase in 
new class action filings by private actors from thirty in 1992 to eighty-five in 
1998 and the fact that thirty to forty percent of EEOC lawsuits in recent years 
have been class actions); Candis A. McGowan, The ABC's of Title VII Class and 
Age Discrimination Collective Actions, 25 AM. J. TRIAL Anvoc. 257, 257 (2001) 
(noting "small scale" resurgence in class actions). The Second Circuit has 
recently determined that a class that seeks compensatory damages in addition 
to injunctive relief may be certified under Rule 23(b)(2), which may increase the 
number of class actions. See Robinson v. Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co., 267 
F.3d 147, 164 (2d Cir. 2001). The court also determined that partial class 
certification is a possibility. Id. at 167-69. This decision creates a circuit split 
on these issues. See Claimants Who Seek Damages as Well as Injunctive Relief 
Are Not Necessarily Barred from Maintaining Class Action, 168 BNA LAB. REL. 
REP. 193, 200, 202-03 (2001). 
190. See Conference Report: Attorneys Discuss Strategies for Bringing, 
Defending FLSA Collective Action Lawsuits, DAILY LAB. REP. No. 156, at C-1 
(Aug. 13, 2002) (citing "recent proliferation of collective actions" spurring 
discussion about litigation strategy at ABA Annual Meeting); As Overtime 
Lawsuits Renew FLSA Debate, Attorneys Advise Learning the Wage Law, 170 
BNA LAB. REL. REP. 145, 152 (2002) (discussing increase in FLSA lawsuits, 
particularly class actions, and noting several multi-million dollar settlements in 
class cases); 'Huge Upsurge' Seen in Wage-Hour Class Actions, Enforcement of 
FLSA Has Become a 'Major Component' in Organizing, 166 BNA LAB. REL. REP 
417, 442 (2001); Wage-Hour Class Actions Beat EEO in Federal Courts Last 
Year, 169 BNA LAB. REL. REP. 273, 285 (2002) (citing analysis showing seventy-
nine new class action filings in 2001 as compared to seventy-seven new EEO 
class actions); Sudbury et al., Collective Actions, supra note 3, at 45. 
191. See Ronald M. Green, Class Actions in Equal Employment Matters, in 
LITIGATING EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CASES 303, 311 (2001); Retirees 
Granted Partial Class Certification in Their Challenge to Plan Terminations, 
DAILY LAB. REP. No. 210, at A-6 (Oct. 30, 2002) (discussing decision by United 
States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia to certify class in 
retirees' claims alleging violation of the terms of the ERISA plans and breach of 
contract, but denying class status for promissory estoppel claims under ERISA). 
Class action lawsuits against managed care companies are increasing 
substantially, some under ERISA and others under various state laws. See 
Ardyth J. Eisenberg, When HMO Patients Can't Get No Satisfaction, 4 DEPAUL 
J. HEALTH CARE L. 367, 387-89 (2001); Laurie McGinley & Milo Geyelin, 
Attorneys Prepare Suits Against HMOs: Class-Action Strategy Used Against 
Tobacco Industry Is Readied for New Push, WALL ST. J., Sept. 30, 1999, at A3. 
The suits against managed care companies most likely would not be affected by 
an arbitration agreement with the employer unless an employment agreement 
included an agreement to arbitrate claims against the provider of health 
insurance through the employer. 
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and analysis by attorneys and experts, as well as time-consuming 
and costly discovery, even prior to a determination of whether the 
class should be certified. 192 Because of these costs, there is 
substantial pressure on companies to settle class claims.193 
Mediation is frequently used as a settlement technique, which may 
increase the costs.194 Class actions may attract media attention, 
harming the company's reputation and even affecting stock value. 195 
It is little wonder that class actions are feared by companies and 
valued by plaintiffs and their counsel. 
The class action typically is filed by an individual or individuals 
on behalf of a similarly situated class of employees. It might be 
argued that the filing of a class claim is an individual rather than a 
concerted act, because it requires no authorization from other 
employees to speak on their behalf and no prior consultation with 
potential class members. Regardless of whether the action is filed 
under Rule 23 or Section 216 of the FLSA, however, the employee is 
seeking to initiate concerted activity, and thus, is protected by the 
current Board interpretation of concerted activity.196 Like the 
employee who contacts fellow employees for support or approaches 
the union to begin an organizing campaign, the class plaintiff is 
invoking a Section 7 right. 197 If the class is certified, other 
employees will either opt into the class or be given notice and the 
opportunity to opt out.198 If they do not opt out in Rule 23 class 
actions, they become a part of the class covered by the lawsuit. 199 In 
either event, a group action results. So long as the complaint is filed 
under a statute that addresses terms and conditions of employment, 
e.g., discrimination, wages, hours, leave, or other benefits, the filing 
192. Sudbury et al., Keeping the Monster in the Closet, supra note 3, at 20. 
193. Id. at 6, 22-23. 
194. Id. at 20-21. 
195. Id. at 21. 
196. See supra notes 112-17 and accompanying text. If there are multiple 
class plaintiffs, the action is even more clearly concerted, as it involves two or 
more employees acting jointly to address a workplace complaint. For examples 
of class actions brought by two or more employees, see Saur v. Snappy Apple 
Farms, Inc., 203 F.R.D. 281, 284, 290 (W.D. Mich. 2001) (certifying class action 
under Fair Labor Standards Act brought by two farm workers); Allen v. City of 
Chi., No. 98 C 7673, 2001 WL 1548966, at *1, 4 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 23, 2001) 
(certifying class action under Title VII brought by group of minority police 
officers). 
197. See supra notes 73, 112-17 and accompanying text; see also 29 U.S.C. § 
157 (2000) (specifying that joining and assisting labor organizations are 
protected concerted activities). 
198. See supra notes 184-88 and accompanying text. 
199. See supra note 186 and accompanying text. In many Rule 23 cases, 
opting out is not permissible. See supra note 186. 
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of a class action lawsuit should be considered protected concerted 
activity. 
Long ago, the Board correctly recognized that solicitation of 
representation rights from fellow employees for a legal claim under 
the FLSA is protected concerted activity.200 In that case, the Board 
and the enforcing court expressly rejected the employer's argument 
that the action was individual, and thus, not concerted. 201 The 
court's decision reflects quite directly that the Act's protection 
encompasses collective legal actions, which combine resources of the 
plaintiffs for purposes of financing litigation and consolidating 
power to combat more effectively the employer's greater resources. 
By soliciting signatures to the petition, Sturdivant was 
seeking to obtain such solidarity among the zanjeros as would 
enable the exertion of group pressure upon the Association in 
regard to possible negotiation and settlement of the zanjeros' 
claims. If suit were filed, such solidarity might enable more 
effective financing of the expenses involved. Thus, in a real 
sense, circulation of the petition was for the purpose of 
"mutual aid or protection." The Association argues that any 
legal rights to backpay on the part of the zanjeros were 
individual rights and that therefore there could be no "mutual" 
aid or protection. But the Association ignores the fact that 
"concerted activity for the purpose of * * * mutual aid or 
protection" is often an effective weapon for obtaining that to 
which the participants, as individuals, are already "legally" 
entitled. 202 
As indicated by this quoted passage, the fundamental purpose 
of protecting concerted activity is to enable the precise sort of 
collective activity that a class action entails-the banding together 
of employees to assert rights against a more powerlul employer. 203 
In determining whether conditioning employment on waiver of 
the right to litigate violates the Act, one must consider whether it is 
the right to litigate in court that is protected or the right to a 
hearing on the claim regardless of the forum. lfit is the latter, then 
the employment is not conditioned on waiver of the right to engage 
200. Salt River Valley Water Users' Ass'n, 99 N.L.R.B. 849, 853-54 (1952), 
enforced, 206 F.2d 325, 328 (9th Cir. 1953). 
201. Salt River Valley Water Users' Ass'n, 206 F.2d at 328; Salt River Valley 
Water Users' Ass'n, 99 N.L.R.B. at 853-54. 
202. Salt River Valley Water Users' Ass'n, 206 F.2d at 328. 
203. Section 1 of the Wagner Act incorporates the congressional findings 
that the inequality of bargaining power between employees and employers 
adversely impacts commerce and prolongs business depressions. 29 U.S.C. § 
151 (2000). Congress intended for the protection of employee rights to associate 
and organize to help correct that inequality. Id. 
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in concerted activity.204 In reviewing the law regarding class actions 
and arbitration, it becomes evident that mandatory arbitration will 
often preclude class action, and thus concerted activity altogether. 
Because arbitration is often used to avoid class actions, some 
arbitration provisions specifically preclude class claims.205 Others 
are silent as to whether class-wide arbitrations are permissible.206 
Analysis of the case law to date demonstrates that arbitration has 
successfully precluded class action litigation in many cases and class 
action arbitration has not been substituted. In a thorough review of 
the law relating to class actions and arbitration published in 2000, 
Professor Jean Sternlight found that few courts had ordered class 
arbitrations.207 Subsequent cases have continued the trend.208 Most 
courts are unwilling to hold that an arbitration agreement is 
unenforceable because it precludes class litigation.209 Furthermore, 
204. This issue is discussed infra Part VI.B. 
205. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
206. Sternlight, supra note 3, at 62. Sternlight's article looked at class 
action and arbitration generally and was not restricted to employment cases. 
207. Id. at 38. 
208. See, e.g., Randolph v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 244 F.3d 814, 819 (11th 
Cir. 2001) (holding that arbitration agreement is enforceable although it 
precludes the plaintiff from using class action procedures); Johnson v. W. 
Suburban Bank, 225 F.3d 366, 369 (3d Cir. 2000) (same), cert. denied sub nom. 
Johnson v. Tele-Cash, Inc., 531 U.S. 1145 (2001); Adkins v. Labor Ready, Inc., 
185 F. Supp. 2d 628, 645-46 (S.D. W. Va. 2001) (same), affd, 303 F.3d 496 (4th 
Cir. 2002); Arriaga v. Cross Country Bank, 163 F. Supp. 2d 1189, 1195 (S.D. 
Cal. 2001) (same). 
209. Randolph, 244 F.3d at 815, 819; Arriaga, 163 F. Supp. 2d at 1195, 1202 
(granting motion to compel arbitration despite arbitral preclusion of class 
actions); Hale v. First USA Bank, No. 00 Civ. 5406, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
8045, at *20-23 (S.D.N.Y. June 12, 2001) (finding that unavailability of class 
action does not render TILA claim inarbitrable); Pyburn v. Bill Heard 
Chevrolet, 63 S.W.3d 351, 364-65 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001) (finding that trial court 
erred in refusing to enforce agreement to arbitrate claims under the Tennessee 
Consumer Protection Act and related common law claims based on the 
unavailability of a class action where no class was certified); Sternlight, supra 
note 3, at 58-62 and cases cited therein. In Green Tree Financial Corp. v. 
Randolph, the Supreme Court declined to address Randolph's argument that 
the arbitration agreement was unenforceable because it precluded class actions, 
as the court below did not address that contention. 531 U.S. 79, 92 n.7 (2000). 
Justice Ginsburg, in dissent, read the majority opinion as permitting the 
plaintiff to seek a determination of that issue by the Eleventh Circuit. Id. at 97 
n.4 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). On remand, the Eleventh Circuit held that the 
agreement was enforceable even if it precluded class claims, because class 
claims are waivable. Randolph, 244 F.3d at 818. The court declined to 
interpret the silent arbitration agreement to permit class claims since Randolph 
had not made that argument initially, but suggested that based on prior circuit 
precedent, it would not interpret the agreement to allow class actions without 
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many courts have interpreted silent agreements to preclude arbitral 
class actions. 210 Where the agreement expressly prohibits class 
claims, a few courts have permitted litigation of class claims while 
requiring arbitration of individual claims, while most have required 
individual arbitration without permitting class litigation.211 
Thus far most of the litigation relating to arbitration and class 
claims has involved consumer claims.212 In Gilmer u. 
an explicit provision. Id. at 815-16. The recently revised Uniform Arbitration 
Act does not address class actions. Janet Hill, The Revised Uniform Arbitration 
Act: Third Leg of Modern Arbitration Law, II. Employee Perspective, in 
ARBITRATION 2001: ARBITRATING IN AN EVOLVING LEGAL ENVIRONMENT, 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIFTY-FOURTH ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF 
ARBITRATORS 118 (Jay E. Grenig & Steven Briggs eds., 2002). 
210. Sternlight, supra note 3, at 69-71 and cases cited therein; see also 
Randolph, 244 F.3d at 815-16, 818 (declining to interpret the silent arbitration 
agreement to permit class claims in arbitration since Randolph had not made 
that argument initially, but suggesting that based on prior circuit precedent, it 
would not interpret the agreement to allow class actions without an explicit 
provision); Gray v. Conseco, Inc., No. SA CV 00-322-DOC(EEx), 2001 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 21696, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 6, 2001) (refusing to order class arbitration 
where agreement did not address class arbitration). 
211. Johnson, 225 F.3d at 369 (holding that agreement to arbitrate Truth in 
Lending Act claims and Electronic Fund Transfer Act claims is enforceable 
despite the fact that it removes the right to pursue class action, as right may be 
waived); Vigil v. Sears Nat'l Bank, 205 F. Supp. 2d 566, 572-73 (E.D. La. 2002) 
(rejecting plaintiffs argument that arbitration agreement that precluded class 
actions involving small consumer claims unconscionable); Furgason v. 
McKenzie Check Advance, Inc., No. IP00-121-CH/G, 2001WL238129, at *11-12 
(S.D. Ind. Jan. 3, 2001) (enforcing the arbitration agreement and denying the 
plaintiff the right to arbitrate class claims under RICO and state usury statutes 
based on the agreement's provision barring class arbitration); In re Managed 
Care Litig., 132 F. Supp. 2d 989, 999 (S.D. Fla. 2000) (holding class allegations 
involving claims under RICO and ERISA, and other state and federal statutory 
and common law claims do not preclude enforcement of arbitration 
agreements), affd sub nom. In re Humana Inc. Managed Care Litig., 285 F.3d 
971 (11th Cir. 2002), cert. granted on other grounds sub. nom. Pacificare Health 
Sys. Inc. v. Book, 123 S. Ct. 409 (2002); Sternlight, supra note 3, at 62-63, 72-74 
and cases cited therein; cf. Acorn v. Household, Int'l, Inc., 211 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 
1170-72 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (refusing to order arbitration where class actions 
precluded, finding agreement unconscionable); Lozada v. Dale Baker 
Oldsmobile, Inc., 91 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1105 (W.D. Mich. 2000) (refusing to 
enforce arbitration agreement because it precluded class claims under the 
Truth in Lending Act and the Michigan Consumer Protection Act); Szetela v. 
Discover Bank, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 862, 867-68 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (directing 
lower court to strike provision prohibiting class actions from arbitration clause 
as unconscionable and against public policy); State v. Berger, 567 S.E.2d 265 
(W. Va. 2002) (granting writ of prohibition against lower court which had 
ordered arbitration of consumer claim, finding unconscionable the provisions 
limiting punitive damages and class actions). 
212. Since many consumer disputes involve very small losses on the part of 
each individual but significant amounts when aggregated and, thus, would 
never be litigated except on a class basis, this is not surprising. 
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Interstate I Johnson Lane Corp., however, the plaintiff argued that 
enforcing his arbitration agreement was inconsistent with the 
ADEA because class and broad injunctive relief were unavailable. 213 
The Court rejected the argument, noting that injunctive relief was 
available and stating "even if the arbitration could not go forward as 
a class action or class relief could not be granted by the arbitrator, 
the fact that the [ADEA] provides for the possibility of bringing a 
collective action does not mean that individual attempts at 
conciliation were intended to be barred."214 Notably, however, 
Gilmer did not involve a class claim. At most, the Court was stating 
that the plaintiff's argument regarding class relief was unavailing 
where his claim was individual.215 
An arbitration agreement was used to contest class certification 
in the race discrimination case of Wright v. Circuit City Stores, 
Inc. 216 The court dismissed the claims of plaintiffs who had agreed 
to arbitrate claims arising out of their employment211 and Circuit 
City argued with respect to the class certification motion of the 
remaining plaintiffs that the class was not sufficiently numerous 
because of the number of employees who had arbitration 
agreements. 218 While the court denied certification on other 
grounds, this case suggests the possibility that a mandatory 
arbitration agreement that is applied only to some employees might 
bar class claims of other employees not bound.219 
Several courts have addressed the effect of arbitration 
agreements on collective action claims under the FLSA. 220 In Adkins 
213. 500 U.S. 20, 32 (1991). 
214. Id. (quoting Nicholson v. CPC Int'l Inc., 877 F.2d 221, 241 (3d Cir. 
1989) (Becker, J., dissenting)). 
215. Gilmer did not consider the National Labor Relations Act's concerted 
activity provisions. 
216. No. CV 97-B-0776-S, 2001 WL 867399, at *11 (N.D. Ala. Aug. 1, 2001). 
217. Id. at *1 n.l. 
218. Id. at *11. When Circuit City introduced its arbitration program, it was 
optional for current employees, but mandatory for any new employees. Id. at 
*2. Thus, some employees had agreements and others did not. Id. 
219. In another case involving Circuit City's employment arbitration 
agreement, the California Court of Appeals, which found the agreement 
unconscionable on other grounds, noted that it was "suspect" because of its 
limitations on class actions as well. Ramirez v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 90 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 916, 920 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999). Review was subsequently granted, 
deferred, and then dismissed by the California Supreme Court and the case was 
remanded to the appellate court. Ramirez v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 995 P.2d 
137 (Cal. 2000) (en bane) (granting review and deferring, pending the court's 
decision in Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc., 6 P.3d 
669 (Cal. 2000), which was decided August 24, 2000); Ramirez v. Circuit City 
Stores, Inc., 11 P.3d 955 (Cal. 2000) (dismissing review and remanding). 
220. Like consumer claims, FLSA claims may involve a number of employees 
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v. Labor Ready, Jnc.,221 the plaintiff filed a class action claim seeking 
payment for call time, travel time, training time, and overtime. 222 
The district court granted the employer's motion to compel 
arbitration despite the conclusion that a class action could not 
proceed in arbitration.223 Relying on Gilmer and the Truth in 
Lending Act ("TIIA") case of Johnson v. West Suburban Bank, 224 the 
court found that the FLSA did not preclude waivers of the right to 
file a collective action and that by entering the arbitration 
agreement the plaintiff had waived that right. 225 The court reasoned 
that the same remedies would be available in litigation and 
arbitration and in response to the argument that plaintiffs with 
small claims would not be able to vindicate their claims effectively 
without the class action device, the court stated: 
While legal representation for individual claims with small 
amounts at stake in the arbitral forum may lack the vigor of 
legal representation for large class actions proceeding in a 
judicial forum, attorneys should nevertheless not be dissuaded 
from bringing individual FLSA claims of a small monetary 
value within the arbitration forum, particularly when, as here, 
there are a large number of related cases.226 
With less analysis, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit 
affirmed. 227 Because Adkins made no showing as to the cost of 
arbitration, the amount of money at stake for each employee or the 
financial status of the class members, the court found the "complaint 
about the inability to bring a class action moot."228 Further, the 
court asserted that Adkins made no showing that the right to bring 
a class action under the FLSA could not be waived, so the 
with small claims that may never be litigated individually. 
221. 185 F. Supp. 2d 628 (S.D. W. Va. 2001), affd, 303 F.3d 496 (4th Cir. 
2002). 
222. Id. at 630-31. 
223. Id. at 646-47; see also Marzek v. Mori Milk & Ice Cream Co., No. 01 C 
6561, 2002 WL 226761, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 13, 2002) (ordering arbitration of 
FLSA claim, noting that nothing in arbitration agreement precluded class 
claims but also suggesting that if class action were not available agreement 
would still be enforceable). 
224. 225 F.3d 366 (3d Cir. 2000). 
225. Adkins, 185 F. Supp. 2d at 645-46 (citing Johnson, 225 F.3d 366). The 
District Court of Oregon reached a similar conclusion in Horenstein v. Mortgage 
Market, Inc., No. Civ. 98-1104-AA, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22995, at *1 (D. Or. 
July 23, 1999). That decision was affirmed by the Ninth Circuit in an 
unpublished opinion. Horenstein v. Mortgage Mkt., Inc., No. 99-36125, 2001 
U.S. App. LEXIS 9267 (9th Cir. 2001). 
226. Adkins, 185 F. Supp. 2d at 646. 
227. Adkins v. Labor Ready, Inc., 303 F.3d 496 (4th Cir. 2002). 
228. Id. at 503. 
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unavailability of a class action, without more, did not invalidate the 
agreement. 229 
By way of contrast, the United States District Court for the 
District of Minnesota denied a motion to dismiss and compel 
arbitration in a class action claim for overtime under the FLSA.230 
Relying on Gilmer, the employer argued that the collective action 
provision in the FLSA was a procedural right and that denial of the 
right did not prevent vindication of plaintiffs' claims.231 The court 
disagreed, finding that the deprivation of procedural rights can 
have a: 
real and detrimental impact on an individual's ability to 
effectively vindicate his or her substantive statutory rights. 
This is no more true than under the particularized facts of this 
case. As plaintiffs emphasize, the size of each individual 
plaintiffs claim for overtime wages is relatively small. Absent 
the procedural safeguards guaranteed by Congress, most, if 
not all, the plaintiffs will likely forego pursuing their claims.232 
Based on the denial of the right to proceed collectively, along 
with other invalid provisions of the agreement, the court refused to 
force the plaintiffs to arbitrate their claims.233 
While the law regarding class action and arbitration is not 
extensively developed, it seems fair to conclude that there is at least 
229. Id. 
230. Bailey v. Ameriquest Mortgage Co., No. CIV. 01-545(JRTFLN), 2002 
WL 100391, at *9 (D. Minn. Jan. 23, 2002). 
231. Id. at *6-7. The employer also relied on Johnson u. West Suburban 
Bank, 225 F.3d 366 (3d Cir. 2000). Id. Although the agreement was silent as to 
whether the claims could proceed collectively in arbitration, the employer 
clearly took the position that they could not, a position the court accepted. Id. 
232. Id. Similar problems exist under the Worker Adjustment and 
Retraining Notification Act. See Cruz v. Robert Abbey, Inc., 778 F. Supp. 605, 
612 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) (noting in certifying class that many individuals would be 
unlikely to pursue claims in the absence of class certification), remanded sub 
nom. Cruz v. Local No. 3, IBEW, 34 F.3d 1148 (2d Cir. 1994). 
233. Bailey, 2002 WL 100391, at *6-9. Among the other provisions the court 
found problematic were a reduced statute of, limitations that limited the 
plaintiffs' damage recovery, a fee splitting provision, and a requirement that 
plaintiffs travel to California to arbitrate their claims. Id. at *7. Bailey 
invalidated the agreement because of the inconsistency of the deprivation of the 
right to proceed collectively with the statute. Id. Other courts have evaluated 
the deprivation of class action on unconscionability grounds. See, e.g., Vigil v. 
Sears Nat'l Bank, 205 F. Supp. 2d 566, 573 (E.D. La. 2002) (rejecting plaintiffs 
argument that arbitration agreement that precluded class actions involving 
small consumer claims was unconscionable); Szetela v. Discover Bank, 118 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 862, 862 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (finding prohibition on class action 
unconscionable and thus, invalid). 
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a substantial risk that an arbitration agreement will preclude class 
action claims altogether, unless it specifically provides for class 
arbitration.234 Accordingly, at a minimum, employer imposition of 
an arbitration agreement that does not expressly permit class 
arbitration should be found to violate the NLRA because it 
interferes with employees' Section 7 rights. 235 This interpretation is 
not only consistent with the law relating to class arbitration; it also 
comports with Board law which invalidates ambiguous employer 
rules that might be interpreted to restrict concerted activity, 
construing them against the drafting employer.236 Moreover, as 
demonstrated by the case of Wright v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 
discussed above, imposition of an arbitration agreement on some 
employees may deprive other employees of their right to engage in 
the concerted activity of a class action. 237 
Such a holding is consistent with the goals and purposes of the 
Act, which was designed to encourage employees to act concertedly 
234. As this Article neared publication, the Supreme Court granted 
certiorari in Green Tree Financial Corp. u. Bazzle, to decide the question of 
whether Section 4 of the Federal Arbitration Act bars class arbitration where 
the arbitration agreement is silent. 123 S. Ct. 817 (2003) (mem.). The decision 
in Bazzle may resolve some of the uncertainty about the availability of class and 
consolidated arbitration. Since some courts have relied on Section 4 to find 
class and consolidated arbitration unavailable where the agreement is silent, 
those courts might alter their view if the Supreme Court rules that Section 4 
does not mandate such a conclusion. See, e.g., Champ v. Siegel Trading Co., 55 
F.3d 269, 275 (7th Cir. 1995); Gray v. Conseco, Inc., No. SA CV 00-0322-
DOC(Eex), 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21696, at *6-7 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 6, 2001). If 
the Court holds in Bazzle that Section 4 prohibits class or consolidated 
arbitration where not expressly authorized by the agreement, then the NLRB 
and the courts should conclude that an arbitration agreement without such 
authorization is void as violative of Section 7 rights. See infra notes 235-54 and 
accompanying text. If the Court finds to the contrary, the presumption of 
illegality should still apply in NLRB proceedings absent express authorization 
of class or consolidated arbitration, at least until it is clear that courts are 
overwhelmingly interpreting silent agreements to permit class and consolidated 
proceedings in arbitration. See id. As discussed infra note 343, a court 
considering the issue on a motion to dismiss a statutory claim based on the 
arbitration agreement could interpret a silent agreement to permit class 
arbitration to avoid the adverse impact on Section 7 rights. 
235. See, e.g., Salt River Valley Water Users' Ass'n v. NLRB, 206 F.2d 325, 
328 (9th Cir. 1953) (upholding the Board's conclusion that circulating petition 
giving employee power of attorney to represent employees in negotiation or 
legal action under Fair Labor Standards Act, to recover pay due, was protected); 
Frierson Bldg. Supply Co., 328 N.L.R.B. 1023, 1026 (1999) (finding concerted 
activity where one employee acted with authorization from other employees); 
Alchris Corp., 301 N.L.R.B. 182, 190 (1991) (same); "The Loft," 277 N.L.R.B. 
1444, 1457 (1986) (same). 
236. See infra notes 279-81 and accompanying text. 
237. See supra notes 216-19 and accompanying text. 
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in order to counter the power of the employer. 238 
The inequality of bargaining power between employees 
who do not possess full freedom of association or actual liberty 
of contract, and employers who are organized in the corporate 
or other forms of ownership association substantially burdens 
and affects the flow of commerce, and tends to aggravate 
recurrent business depressions, by depressing wage rates and 
the purchasing power of wage earners in industry and by 
preventing the stabilization of competitive wage rates and 
working conditions within and between industries.239 
215 
Class actions bring the power of the group to bear on the 
employer accused of discrimination or other violations of employee 
rights. The employees, combining their resources, are better able to 
combat unlawful actions by the more powerful employer. And as the 
Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized, in many situations the 
claims will only be viable if brought collectively. Thus, denial of the 
collective proceeding prevents the employees from using concerted 
activity to vindicate their rights. 
It might be argued, as the employer claimed in Bailey, that the 
right to proceed as a class is a procedural right that attaches to the 
forum of choice.240 In Gilmer, the Court indicated that an arbitration 
agreement was a forum choice, not a waiver of substantive rights, 
and rejected the plaintiff's argument that the consequent waiver of 
procedural rights warranted invalidation of the agreement absent a 
showing that he could not effectively vindicate his statutory rights 
in arbitration as a result.241 Similarly, the argument goes, the choice 
of arbitration (even by adhesion contract) can waive the class action 
procedure. In this respect, there might be a difference between Rule 
23 class actions, which result from a rule of civil procedure, and 
Section 216(b) collective actions, which result from a statutory 
provision in the FLSA. The FLSA, along with the EPA, ADEA, and 
FMLA which adopt its collective action provisions, might be viewed 
as providing a substantive right to proceed collectively.242 If that is 
238. See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2000). 
239. Id. 
240. Bailey v. Ameriquest Mortgage Co., No. CIV. 01-545(JRTFLN), 2002 
WL 100391, at *6 (D. Minn. 2002). For an argument that compulsory 
arbitration does not affect concerted activity because it does not affect 
substantive rights, see RICHARD A. BALES, COMPULSORY ARBITRATION: THE 
GRAND EXPERIMENT IN EMPLOYMENT 68 (1997). Professor Bales, however, 
premises his argument on retention of the right to bring a class action or attain 
class-wide injunctive relief from the arbitrator. Id. 
241. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26, 30-33 (1991). 
242. For a discussion of Section 216(b) claims and arbitration, see Matthew 
W. Finkin, Employee Representation Outside the Labor Act: Thoughts on 
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the case, employees could lawfully be deprived of the right to 
proceed as a class by arbitration agreements applying to claims 
under Title VII, the ADA, and ERISA because class actions exist 
solely by virtue of a procedural rule, but not under the FLSA, EPA, 
ADEA, and the FMLA where there is a statutory right to collective 
action. In addition, because claims under the FLSA and perhaps the 
EPA are more likely to involve smaller amounts, such as pay 
differentials or overtime, deprivation of the class remedy may well 
prevent effective vindication of the claims. 
While Rule 23 is procedural, 243 the Bailey court and others have 
noted that the deprivation of a procedural right can have 
substantive effects.244 One of the objectives of class actions is to 
afford judicial access to plaintiffs with small claims that would 
otherwise be uneconomical to bring.245 In addition, class actions 
have an "enforcement or deterrence" objective, as they serve a private 
attorney general function, bringing collective power to bear on the 
defendant and thus enhancing the government's regulatory 
enforcement resources. 246 This notion of collective power is precisely 
what underlies Section 7.247 This power is the source of much 
resistance to class actions248 and the efforts to use arbitration to 
Arbitral Representation, Group Arbitration and Workplace Committees, 5 U. PA. 
J. LAB. & EMP. L. 75 (2002). Professor Finkin suggests that it would "deny 
fundamental fairness" to allow an employer to preclude both class litigation and 
aggregation of claims in arbitration. Id. at 85. He further argues that 216(b) 
collective claims, requiring opt-in rather than opt-out, could be effectively 
managed in arbitration. Id. at 84. 
243. Differentiating between Rule 23 classes and 216(b) classes is appealing 
because of the distinctive source of the rights. Both have the same purposes 
and effects, however, and both have a direct relationship to the effective use of 
Section 7 rights. 
244. See supra note 232 and accompanying text. In their 2000 book about 
class actions, Professor Hensler and her co-authors note that all of the 
controversy about class actions is at bottom a "dispute about what kinds of 
lawsuits and what kinds of resolutions of lawsuits the legal system should 
enable," a recognition of the substantive nature of the issues. DEBORAH R. 
HENSLER ET AL., CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS: PURSUING PuBLIC GOALS FOR PRIVATE 
GAIN 50 (2000). 
245. HERBERT B. NEWBERG & ALBA CONTE, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS 
§ 1.06, at 1-18 (3d ed. 1992). 
246. Id. at 1-19 & n.72 (noting that the Supreme Court recognized these 
effects of class actions in Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 266 (1972)). 
There is, however, some debate about this regulatory intent of class litigation. 
See HENSLER ET AL., supra note 244, at 69-71. 
247. Indeed, class actions derived from the long English tradition of using 
representative actions to address collective harms. HENSLER ET AL., supra note 
244, at 10. 
248. Class action critics argue that class actions are used as a hammer to 
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eliminate class actions.249 Cases involving civil rights, including 
employment discrimination, have long been a prominent part of 
class action litigation and reform efforts.250 Thus, the class action 
device is not merely a procedure of the forum, but rather a device 
that impacts the effectiveness of the cause of action itself. 
Even more important, the right that is being violated here is the 
substantive Section 7 right to concerted activity which is being 
effectuated through the class action device. Forcing the employee to 
forgo the judicial forum eliminates the vehicle for exercise of the 
Section 7 right, and therefore, deprives the employee of the right 
itself. While Congress could eliminate Rule 23, which would deprive 
employees of their right to file class action discrimination claims 
under Title VII, inter alia, that does not mean that the employer can 
restrict that right. Congress could eliminate the EEOC as a vehicle 
for statutory enforcement, which would also limit a vehicle for 
concerted activity, but the NLRB has held that an employer cannot 
maintain a rule preventing employees from contacting government 
agencies and forcing them to use an internal grievance procedure 
instead, because it interferes with Section 7 rights.251 The 
availability of one vehicle for the exercise of Section 7 rights does 
not justify an employer's restriction of another.252 
In many cases, the class action may be the only effective means 
of effectuating the Section 7 right. Employees with relatively small 
individual claims for overtime pay under the FLSA may be unable to 
afford the cost of arbitration, which will often exceed the value of the 
claim. Where an employer has a discriminatory practice, it may 
continue indefinitely and repeatedly, affecting many other 
employees if it is challenged only through individual arbitrations, 
which provide only individual remedies. Each subsequently affected 
employee would have to bring an individual case and relitigate the 
issue, with the risk of loss, the absence of precedential effect of prior 
decisions, and the costs of litigation. There would be little incentive 
for the recalcitrant employer to eliminate the practice. While 
force businesses into settling nonmeritorious cases to the benefit of the lawyers 
rather than the ostensible plaintiffs. See In re Rhone-Pollenc Rorer, Inc., 51 
F.3d 1294, 1299, 1304 (7th Cir. 1995) (granting mandamus petition and 
directing district court to decertify class citing, inter alia, various authorities 
relating to pressure to settle class actions); HENSLER ET AL., supra note 244, at 
15, 18, 33; Eric D. Green, Advancing Individual Rights Through Group Justice, 
30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 791, 801-02 (1997). 
249. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
250. See HENSLERETAL., supra note 244, at 12, 54, 57, 59. 
251. See infra note 274 and accompanying text. 
252. This argument is further developed in the next section. See infra notes 
274-76 and accompanying text. 
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employees would still be free to discuss the problems of overtime pay 
or discrimination with one another, to approach the employer as a 
group seeking a change in the practice, and to encourage one 
another to arbitrate claims, they would be deprived of the only 
effective way to address the problem-combining their resources as 
a class to utilize their collective power to force the employer to end 
the discrimination-the precise purpose of Section 7. 
Finally, if class arbitration proves as unworkable as its critics 
suggest, 253 then litigation may be the only available vehicle for class 
claims. In that event, the compulsory arbitration agreement cannot 
be upheld even if it permits class arbitration. 
B. Class Arbitration 
The arbitration agreement that does not expressly permit class 
claims is the easiest case.254 Concerted activity is stifled where there 
is no forum for collective claims. Where the agreement permits class 
claims in arbitration,255 the Board or court must determine whether 
precluding class litigation, while permitting class arbitration, chills 
concerted activity. In addition, employees presumably retain the 
right to bring such class claims concertedly to the appropriate 
enforcement agency,256 where one exists.257 
253. For a thorough discussion of the criticisms, see Sternlight, supra note 3, 
at 44-53. Among the difficulties cited are the need for an ongoing judicial role 
to insure protection of the interests of class members, including due process 
rights; logistical difficulties in coordination between the arbitrator and the 
court; and determination as to who selects the arbitrator for the plaintiff class 
members. Id. at 33, 49-53; see also Sara Adler, Employment Class Actions and 
Alternative Dispute Resolution, 53 LAB. L.J. 133, 133, 137 (2002) (pointing out 
that arbitration is currently used for remedial issues in some employment class 
actions and suggesting that use for liability determinations will grow despite 
the complexity and need for continuing court or agency supervision). 
254. Because of the uncertainty about the availability of class arbitration, 
see supra notes 205-37 and accompanying text, the NLRB and the courts should 
find mandatory arbitration agreements that do not expressly permit class 
actions violative of Section 8(a)(l). 
255. This assumes that arbitration proves to be a workable method of 
adjudicating class claims. 
256. In Gilmer, the Court indicated that the employee could still file a 
charge with the EEOC despite the arbitration agreement. Gilmer v. 
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 27 (1991). And in EEOC v. Waffie 
House, Inc., the Supreme Court ruled that the EEOC could seek individual 
relief for employees who signed arbitration agreements. 534 U.S. 279, 306-07 
(2002). Any arbitration agreement that precluded the employee from filing an 
administrative charge should, thus, be found unlawful under Gilmer. It should 
also be found unlawful under the NLRA as barring concerted activity. See infra 
notes 277-81 and accompanying text. 
257. Not all statutes have an agency with independent enforcement 
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Certainly the right to engage in concerted activity is not 
unlimited, and the Board has long held that some concerted activity 
is not protected by the Act. Where employees engage in concerted 
activity that is unlawful, indefensible, or contrary to the statutory 
purpose, they may lose statutory protection. 258 In addition, the 
employer can maintain rules that interfere with some concerted 
activity if the employer interest outweighs that of the employees 
under the Act. 259 
Filing a lawsuit against the company is not unlawful or 
authority. For example, the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification 
Act ("WARN" Act) requires judicial enforcement by affected employees or their 
representative. 29 U.S.C. § 2104(a)(5) (2000). Because individual WARN Act 
damages are small, at most sixty days pay and lost benefits, and plaintiffs have 
lost their employment, effective enforcement requires either class actions or 
representative actions filed by unions. See id. § 2104(a)(l)-(2) (setting forth 
damages); Louise Sadowsky Brock, Overcoming Collective Action Problems: 
Enforcement of Worker Rights, 30 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 781, 802-03 (1997) 
(discussing cases noting the amenability of WARN to class actions and the 
unlikelihood of individual enforcement); Richard W. McHugh, Fair Warning or 
Foul? An Analysis of the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification 
(WARN) Act in Practice, 14 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 60-61 (1993) 
(discussing lack of enforcement and reasons therefore). Requiring arbitration of 
WARN Act claims without permitting class actions would effectively doom 
enforcement where there was no union representative to arbitrate the claim on 
behalf of the employees. Brock, supra, at 802; McHugh, supra, at 61 (noting the 
high percentage of cases brought by unions relative to their percentage in the 
work force). In addition, some state discrimination laws require enforcement 
action by the employee rather than the agency. See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 613.405 (Michie 2000) (providing that any person aggrieved by illegal 
discrimination can file a claim with the Nevada Employment Commission; the 
rules governing the Nevada Equal Rights Commission make no provision for a 
complaint to be filed by the Commission, see NEV. AoMIN. CODE ch. 233-230, 
§ 002 (2002)); see, e.g., WIS. STAT. ANN. § 111.39 (West 2002) (making no 
provision for the Commission or member thereof to file a complaint or act on 
behalf of the complainant in any manner); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 27-9-106 (Michie 
2001) (filing of complaint and request for hearing to be made by aggrieved 
party). 
258. See, e.g., NLRB v. Local 1229, IBEW, 346 U.S. 464, 477-78 (1953) 
(holding discharge of picketing employees lawful where their conduct in 
disparaging the employer's product was disloyal); S. S.S. Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 
31, 32-33, 48 (1942) (holding NLRB abused its discretion by reinstating 
employees who engaged in a work stoppage in violation of the mutiny provisions 
offederal law); NLRB v. Marshall Car Wheel & Foundry Co., 218 F.2d 409, 411, 
416-17 (5th Cir. 1955) (finding employee walkout unprotected where molten 
iron would cause costly damage to machinery if it were allowed to harden); Elk 
Lumber Co., 91 N.L.R.B. 333, 337-39 (1950) (finding slowdown unprotected 
because means unlawful); supra notes 153-54 and accompanying text 
(discussing Emporium Capwell). 
259. See infra notes 263-81 and accompanying text. 
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indefensible, nor is it contrary to the purpose of the NLRA.260 That 
the employees potentially would retain a forum for adjudicating 
complaints (the arbitration procedure) does not privilege employer 
insistence that employees waive the right to bring a class action 
lawsuit. The right to engage in concerted activity is an employee 
right. Absent conduct which justifies loss of protection, the 
employer should not be able to penalize employees for engaging in 
concerted activity or condition employment on waiving the right to 
participate in particular types of concerted activity. The employer 
unquestionably cannot promote one union over another, thereby 
interfering with the employees' choice of representative.261 Nor 
should the employer be permitted to interfere with employee choice 
as to the form of protest against the employer's discriminatory or 
otherwise unlawful working conditions, for the employer is still 
limiting the employee's statutory right.262 
The Board has permitted employers to restrict Section 7 rights 
where an employer interest outweighs that of the employees. For 
example, an employer's property interest allows it to exclude union 
activity by nonemployees on site unless the employees are otherwise 
inaccessible.26.3 An employer's interest in productivity permits 
restriction of union solicitation on work time. 264 In Desert Palace, 
Inc.,265 despite the restriction on concerted activity, an employer 
lawfully maintained and enforced a confidentiality rule during an 
investigation of illegal drug activity in order to protect witnesses 
from danger and prevent destruction of evidence and fabrication of 
testimony.266 The burden is on the employer, however, to justify its 
260. The only exception is where the lawsuit is filed in bad faith. See supra 
note 158 and accompanying text. 
261. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (2000); NLRB v. Keller Ladders S., Inc., 405 
F.2d 663, 667 (5th Cir. 1968) (employer violated Act by aiding union in 
organizing employees); Windsor Place Corp., 276 N.L.R.B. 445, 449 (1985) 
(finding unlawful employer assistance to union in soliciting authorization 
cards); cf. RCA del Caribe, Inc., 262 N.L.R.B. 963, 965-68 (1982) (finding it 
lawful for employer to continue bargaining with incumbent union despite filing 
of petition by rival union, noting that any action by employer could be perceived 
as favoring one union over another); Bruckner Nursing Home, 262 N.L.R.B. 
955, 957-58 (1982) (permitting employer in rival union situation to recognize 
majority union before filing of petition, but finding post-petition recognition to 
be unlawful influence over employees' free choice). 
262. While the limits on employee choice of representative derive from 
Section 8(a)(2), it is consistent with that interpretation and with the purpose of 
the Act to read Section 8(a)(l) as prohibiting interference with the employee's 
choice as to the form his or her concerted activity should take. 
263. Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 531-32 (1992). 
264. Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 794-95, 804-05 (1945). 
265. Desert Palace, Inc., 336 N.L.R.B. No. 19 (Sept. 28, 2001). 
266. Id. at *2; cf Phoenix Transit Sys., 337 N.L.R.B. No. 78, at *1 (May 10, 
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curtailment of employee Section 7 rights.267 In Desert Palace, Inc., 
the confidentiality requirement was justified based on allegations of 
a management cover-up of the drug use and threats of retaliation 
and violence against witnesses. 268 However, in another case, an 
employer could not justify a confidentiality rule that prohibited 
employees from discussing sexual harassment complaints among 
themselves and with third parties.269 
To justify restriction to the arbitral forum, the employer might 
argue that it must require all employees to arbitrate in order to 
establish an effective arbitration system.270 If employees could opt 
out, then the system would not be cost effective for the employer to 
create. In addition, the employer might suggest that arbitration 
provided a benefit to the employees as a whole, by providing a 
quicker, cheaper forum for dispute resolution,271 which warrants 
restriction on the Section 7 rights of those who want to escape the 
arbitral system. Thus, the employer (and employee) interest in 
establishing the system justifies the limitation on Section 7 rights. 
It seems unlikely that this argument would merit restricting either 
class or consolidated claims altogether because the legitimate 
interests of the employer could be satisfied by permitting such 
claims to proceed in arbitration. 272 The employer interest in 
establishing an arbitration system could be satisfied by offering it to 
managers and supervisors not covered by the Act, and by 
persuading enough employees to agree to arbitration voluntarily to 
make the system cost effective.273 Relying on the employer's 
assertion of the employee interest is a questionable method. If the 
employer cannot convince enough employees of the value of the 
system to obtain voluntary agreement without threat of loss of 
employment, then the burden on Section 7 rights is not justifiable. 
2002) (finding rule requiring confidentiality of sexual harassment complaints 
overly broad and unlawful). 
267. Desert Palace, Inc., 336 N.L.R.B. No. 19, at *5. 
268. Id. at *2. 
269. Phoenix Transit Sys., 337 N.L.R.B. No. 78, at *l. At the time of 
enforcement, the investigation was complete although the employees had not 
been so informed. Id. at *3-4. 
270. See Estreicher, Predispute Agreements, supra note 20, at 1358-59. 
271. See Estreicher, Saturns for Rickshaws, supra note 5, at 563-64; St. 
Antoine, supra note 5, at 91-93. 
272. The interest in avoiding class actions that employers frequently assert 
is not an interest that should be given any weight. See supra note 3 and 
accompanying text. 
273. Employees have a right under Section 7 to refrain from concerted 
activity. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2000). Accordingly, any employee could agree to 
arbitrate individually rather then participating in a concerted class claim so 
long as such agreement was not coerced by threat of deprivation of employment. 
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Although the Supreme Court has suggested that agreement to 
arbitration is merely agreement to an alternative forum, the Board 
has not permitted employers or unions to cabin employees' choice of 
forum for vindicating statutory rights. The employer cannot 
lawfully insist to impasse in negotiations on a contractual provision 
that bars processing of a grievance where the employee files a 
statutory claim. 274 The employer cannot refuse to discuss grievances 
where the employee has filed a statutory claim.275 Nor can the union 
insist that employees exhaust internal union remedies before filing 
unfair labor practice charges, unless purely internal union matters 
are involved. 276 This is so despite the fact that employees retain the 
right to pursue their claim in one forum. Following these 
precedents, the employer should not be able to insist that the 
employee limit forum choice for concerted activity by conditioning 
employment on such a waiver. A strong employer could force 
employees (or unions) to agree to pursue claims in the forum least 
likely to vindicate the employee rights. 
Furthermore, although the arbitration agreement may not 
expressly preclude the employees from filing administrative charges 
with an agency such as the EEOC, it may discourage such charges 
because the employees may perceive the agreement as limiting them 
to the arbitral forum. As the Board noted in Reichhold Chemicals:277 
Notwithstanding that the literal scope of the proposed waiver 
is narrow, we find merit in the General Counsel's contention 
that the waiver could have an improper chilling effect on the 
filing of charges in situations where the purported waiver 
would be ineffective .... [E]mployees likely would read the 
waiver as foreclosing all recourse to the Board concerning 
discipline linked to the no-strike clause, and thus there is a 
strong probability that employees would not even make such 
an inquiry [to the Board regarding the scope of the waiver].278 
As in Reichhold, employees might be chilled from filing charges 
concertedly with the EEOC by an arbitration agreement, even if 
such action were not barred. Thus, the retention of that right does 
not save the employer who conditions employment on the waiver of 
litigation. 
274. See Kolman/Athey, 303 N.L.R.B. 92, 96 (1991); see also Kinder-Care 
Learning Ctrs., 299 N.L.R.B. 1171, 1171 (1990) (finding employer requirement 
that employees make complaints to the employer before approaching any other 
organization or agency with the complaint violated Section 8(a)(l)). 
275. See Cal. Pie Co., 329 N.L.R.B. 968, 975 (1999). 
276. See NLRB v. Indus. Union of Marine & Shipbuilding Workers of Am., 
391 U.S. 418, 424-25 (1968). 
277. 288 N.L.R.B. 69 (1988). 
278. Id. at 72. 
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The Board historically has evinced concern with overly broad 
employer rules that have the potential to chill protected employee 
conduct. 279 Where a rule is ambiguous and can be read to prohibit 
statutorily protected activity, the ambiguity has been construed 
against the employer as drafter of the rule, rendering the rule 
unlawful on its face. 280 Consistent with this precedent, an 
arbitration agreement which can be read to preclude any protected 
activity such as filing an EEOC charge or initiating a class action, is 
invalid on its face even if the employer did not intend to bar such 
action.281 
C. Individual and Multiple Employee Claims 
The class action is the clearest, but not the only form of 
concerted activity involved in adjudicating employment law claims. 
A mandatory arbitration agreement also interferes with protected 
activity because it bars two or more employees from acting together 
to litigate statutory discrimination claims. Such joint litigation 
would certainly be protected as concerted282 and is not uncommon. 283 
279. See, e.g., Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 795-96, 803 
(1945) (upholding Board decision striking down, as overly broad, a rule 
prohibiting solicitation on non-work time); IRIS U.S.A., Inc., 336 N.L.R.B. No. 
98, at *1 (Nov. 9, 2001) (finding unlawful maintenance of a rule requiring 
employees to keep information about employees confidential despite lack of 
evidence of enforcement); Lafayette Park Hotel, 326 N.L.R.B. 824, 825 (1998) 
(applying standard that invalidates rules that would "reasonably tend to chill 
employees in the exercise of their Section 7 rights" even in the absence of 
enforcement); Am. Cast Iron Pipe Co., 234 N.L.R.B. 1126, 1133-34 (1978), 
enforced, 600 F.2d 132 (8th Cir. 1979) (invalidating rule that prohibited false 
statements, rather than maliciously false statements, as overbroad). 
280. Lafayette Park Hotel, 326 N.L.R.B. at 828; James E. Stanford, Inc., 249 
N.L.R.B. 623, 624 (1980) (stating that: 
[i]t is well settled that the reasonably foreseeable effects of the 
wording of a no-solicitation rule on the conduct of employees will 
determine its legality, and that where the language is ambiguous and 
may be misinterpreted by the employees in such a way as to cause 
them to refrain from exercising their statutory rights, then the rule is 
invalid even if interpreted lawfully by the employer in practice). 
281. While a court deciding a motion to compel arbitration in lieu of 
litigation might read an arbitration agreement to omit unlawful provisions and 
thereby find it enforceable, see infra note 343, the Board should invalidate an 
arbitration provision that is susceptible of an interpretation that limits 
concerted activity because of the chilling effect on employee rights. The 
employer can then redraft the agreement to comply with the law. 
282. See, e.g., Franklin Iron & Metal Corp., 315 N.L.R.B. 819, 822 (1994) 
(finding that two employees who agreed to file anti-discrimination charges and 
went to the agency together but filed separate charges alleging racial 
discrimination in their wages were engaged in concerted activity); see also 
Mohave Elec. Coop., Inc. v. NLRB, 206 F.3d 1183, 1187, 1189 (D.C. Cir. 2000) 
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Similarly, it would bar litigation by an employee seeking injunctive 
relief which would benefit all employees, with the support and/or 
authorization of at least one of those employees. 284 And finally it 
might be construed to prohibit litigation by one employee supported 
by others who have agreed to serve as witnesses for the employee 
who sues.285 If the mandatory arbitration agreement does not permit 
joint arbitration or broad injunctive relief benefiting a class even 
where the arbitration is initiated by one employee, then it clearly 
inhibits concerted activity in violation of the Act. Furthermore, if 
litigation preclusion alone violates the Act, as argued above, then 
employment could not lawfully be conditioned on an arbitration 
agreement that bars litigation. 
1. Joint or Consolidated Claims 
While the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are generous in 
allowing the federal courts to consolidate claims in one case and to 
join additional parties, 286 arbitral consolidation is more 
(finding two employees who filed petitions for injunctions in municipal court in 
an effort to protect themselves from physical harassment by management after 
meeting with other employees who supported and encouraged the filing, were 
discharged for engaging in protected concerted activity). 
283. See, e.g., Fisher v. Transco Services-Milwaukee, Inc., 979 F.2d 1239, 
1241-42 (7th Cir. 1992) (two employees filed suit jointly under ADEA 
challenging their terminations); Lockart v. Westinghouse Credit Corp., 879 F.2d 
43, 46 (3d Cir. 1989) (multiple former employees filed age discrimination 
claims); Curtis v. Airborne Freight Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 234, 235-36 (S.D.N.Y. 
2000) (claim by African-American and Hispanic employees alleging racial 
discrimination under Title VII); Vonderohe v. B & S of Fort Wayne, Inc., 36 F. 
Supp. 2d 1079, 1080 (N.D. Ind. 1999) (four female employees filed a sexual 
harassment claim against the corporation); McCleland v. Montgomery Ward & 
Co., No. 95C237, 1995 WL 374185, at *1 (N.D. Ill. June 21, 1995) (three female 
employees filed Title VII sexual harassment claim against their employer). 
284. See, e.g., Criswell v. W. Airlines, Inc., 709 F.2d 544, 546, 547 & n.2, 558 
(9th Cir. 1983) (affirming district court's injunctive relief against system-wide 
application of age-based retirement policy although no class action filed), aff d, 
472 U.S. 400 (1985). 
285. See, e.g., Boese Hilburn Elec. Serv. Co., 313 N.L.R.B. 372, 372-73 (1993) 
(finding employee who orally supported another employee's claim that failure to 
provide her with maternity leave was unfair was engaged in concerted activity); 
Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 297 N.L.R.B. 322, 322-23, 327 (1989) (finding 
employee engaged in concerted activity when he intervened with employer on 
behalf of employee who was being sexually harassed and then took her to 
antidiscrimination agency to file charges about the harassment), enforced, 930 
F.2d 316 (3d Cir. 1991). An arbitration agreement would interfere with 
concerted activity in these circumstances only if the argument that limiting 
plaintiffs to a particular forum for concerted activity is unlawful is accepted. 
See supra notes 258-81 and accompanying text. 
286. See FED. R. CIV. P. 42(a) (stating that: 
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problematic.287 The federal courts commonly· permit employment 
law claims of multiple employees to be joined for purposes of 
litigation where there is a common question of law or fact, broadly 
interpreted.288 It is not uncommon for arbitration agreements to ban 
consolidation of claims. 289 Further, as in the case of class actions, a 
number of courts have refused to order consolidated arbitration 
where the agreement does not expressly permit consolidation. 290 
[w]hen actions involving a common question oflaw or fact are pending 
before the court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the 
matters in issue in the actions; it may order all the actions 
consolidated; and it may make such orders concerning proceedings 
therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay); 
FED. R. CIV. P. 19 (addressing joinder of persons needed for just adjudication); 
FED. R. Crv. P. 20(a) (stating that: 
[a]ll persons may join in one action as plaintiffs if they assert any 
right to relief jointly, severally, or in the alternative in respect of or 
arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of 
transactions or occurrences and if any question of law or fact common 
to all these persons will arise in the action); 
FED. R. Crv. P. 24 (addressing both permissive intervention and intervention as 
of right). 
287. See Protective Life Ins. Corp. v. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Corp., 873 F.2d 
281, 282 (11th Cir. 1989); Sternlight, supra note 3, at 70-71, 84-85 and cases 
cited therein. For a thorough discussion of the consolidation issue, see Thomas 
J. Stipanowich, Arbitration and the Multiparty Dispute: The Search for 
Workable Solutions, 72 IOWA L. REV. 473 (1987). 
288. Alexander v. Fulton County, 207 F.3d 1303, 1322-24 (11th Cir. 2000) 
(finding that multiple discrimination claims were properly tried together under 
Rule 20); King v. Ralston Purina Co., 97 F.R.D. 477, 478-79, 481 (W.D.N.C. 
1983) (refusing to sever age discrimination claims of three employees who 
worked in different locations and different divisions where they alleged 
company wide policy of discrimination); King v. Pepsi Cola Metro. Bottling Co., 
86 F.R.D. 4, 5-6 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (refusing to sever claims by six employees 
alleging race discrimination, finding that allegations of a policy of 
discrimination constituted a common question of fact sufficient to justify 
joinder). 
289. See Fields v. Howe, No. IP-01-1036-C-B/S, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4515, 
at *9 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 14, 2002); Pick v. Discover Fin. Servs., Inc., No. 00-935-
SLR, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15777, at *6 (D. Del. Sept. 28, 2001); Flores v. 
Transamerica HomeFirst, Inc., 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 376, 379 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001). 
290. See Clarendon Nat'l Ins. Co. v. John Hancock Life Ins. Co., No. 00 Civ. 
9222, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13736, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 2001); Dominium 
Austin Partners, L.L.C. v. Lindquist, No. C5-00-2010, 2001 Minn. App. LEXIS 
943, at *26-28 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 21, 2001) (citing Eighth Circuit's 
interpretation of FAA to preclude consolidation where agreement is silent, and 
distinguishing Minnesota Supreme Court case permitting consolidation); 
Sternlight, supra note 3, at 70-71, 84-85 and cases cited therein; cf Northeast 
Concrete Prods. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., No. 99-6377, 2002 R.I. Super. LEXIS 
58, at *7-8 (R.I. Super. Ct. Apr. 23, 2002) (noting the general trend against 
consolidation without party consent, but ordering consolidation in case where 
the parties and issues were intertwined and neither party could demonstrate 
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Indeed, many of the cases denying class arbitration rely on the lack 
of authority to consolidate claims where the agreement does not 
expressly provide for consolidation. 291 For purposes of the issue here 
then, the result should be the same. If the agreement or arbitral 
law does not expressly permit joint arbitration, 292 the agreement 
should be invalidated, as it interferes with the employees' rights to 
file concerted claims against the employer. 
2. Broad Injunctive Relief 
Under the employment discrimination laws, where unlawful 
conduct is found that affects individuals other than the plaintiffs, 
courts can enjoin the practice for the benefit of those affected even if 
no class action was filed. 293 This is true even if the court finds that 
the plaintiff is not entitled to relief, so long as there is a 
discriminatory practice.294 An arbitrator's ability to award 
injunctive relief benefiting others, in addition to (or in lieu of) the 
plaintiff will depend upon the arbitration agreement and the law 
pursuant to which the arbitration is conducted.295 Traditionally, 
prejudice from consolidation). 
291. See Iowa Grain Co. v. Brown, 171 F.3d 504, 509 (7th Cir. 1999); Champ 
v. Siegel Trading Co., Inc., 55 F.3d 269, 274-75 (7th Cir. 1995); Gray v. Conseco, 
Inc., No. SA CV 00-0322-DOC(EEx), 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21696, at *6-7 (C.D. 
Cal., Sept. 6, 2001). 
292. The Revised Uniform Arbitration Act, completed in 2000, recognized 
the trend of cases under the FAA against consolidation, and provided for 
consolidation of related claims unless barred by the arbitration agreement. See 
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Revised 
Uniform Arbitration Act § 10 and comments, available at http://www.law. 
upenn.edu/bll/ulc/uarba/arbpso500.pdf (last visited July 1, 2002). Under 
California law, consolidation is expressly permitted by statute and arbitral class 
actions are permissible. See Victoria E. Brieant & William N. Hebert, 
Developing Legal Issues and Effective Practice Techniques in Mediation and 
Arbitration, ALI-ABA SE28 (Vol. II 1999) (citing Civ. Proc. Code § 1281.3 and 
Keating v. Superior Court, 183 Cal. Rptr. 360 (Cal. 1982)). 
293. 2 EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 1749 (Barbara Lindemann & Paul 
Grossman eds., 3d ed. 1996). 
294. 2 id. at 1750. 
295. The Federal Arbitration Act does not expressly address injunctive 
relief, or indeed, the arbitrator's remedial authority in general. The Revised 
Uniform Arbitration Act contains a catchall remedial provision authorizing 
"such remedies as the arbitrator considers just and appropriate." See Stephen 
L. Hayford, The Revised Uniform Arbitration Act: Third Leg of Modern 
Arbitration Law, I. Presenter, in ARBITRATION 2001: ARBITRATING IN AN 
EVOLVING LEGAL ENVIRONMENT, PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIFTY-FOURTH ANNUAL 
MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS, supra note 209, at 100. Some 
courts have refused to order arbitration of statutory claims where the arbitrator 
does not have the authority to award all remedies that would be available in 
litigation, while other courts have severed remedial limitations and ordered 
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arbitral injunctive relief was rarely awarded.296 As arbitration has 
expanded in scope, however, arbitral injunctive relief has become 
more common.
297 Nevertheless, at least one court has declined to 
order arbitration of claims for broad injunctive relief. 
In Broughton v. Cigna Healthplans, 298 the California Supreme 
Court declined to order arbitration of the request for public 
injunctive relief against the defendant's alleged deceptive 
practices. 299 The court articulated two related concerns about 
arbitration of such claims. First, the purpose of the request for 
relief is to benefit the public, not the private litigant. 300 Second, 
because subsequent arbitrators are generally not bound by the 
decisions of prior arbitrators, even in the same case, there are 
problems with the ongoing supervision and enforcement of any 
permanent injunction.301 A member of the public desirous of 
enforcing the injunction would have to initiate another action and 
might obtain a different result.302 Accordingly, the court construed 
the statute at issue to deny arbitration of claims for public 
arbitration. See 2 LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION § 45.04[5] (Tim 
Bornstein et al. eds., 2d ed. 2002) and cases cited therein. Still other courts 
have refused to invalidate arbitration agreements based on damage limitations. 
Id.; see also supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
296. See ELKOURI & ELKOURI: How ARBITRATION WORKS 397 (Marlin M. Volz 
& Edward P. Goggin eds., 5th ed. 1997) (referring to labor arbitration and 
noting that use of injunctive remedies is increasing); MARVIN F. HILL, JR. & 
ANTHONY v. SINICROPI, REMEDIES IN ARBITRATION 309-10 (2d ed. 1991) (noting 
that "injunctive-type" relief is generally considered to be within the authority of 
the labor arbitrator, but that prohibitory injunctions are less common than 
mandatory injunctions). 
297. See, e.g., Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 32 
(1991) (noting that the agreement did not restrict the type of relief available 
and declining to deny enforcement of the arbitration agreement on the ground 
that broad equitable relief was not available); Vascular and Gen. Surgical 
Assocs., Ltd. v. Loiterman, 599 N.E. 2d 1246, 1251 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (finding 
that arbitrator had authority to issue injunction where employment agreement 
clearly contemplated injunctive relief without expressly limiting such relief to 
judicial actions and agreement incorporated American Arbitration Association 
rules which state that arbitrator has authority to grant equitable relief). But 
see Lozada v. Dale Baker Oldsmobile, Inc., 91 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1099-104 (W.D. 
Mich. 2000) (finding unconscionable and unenforceable arbitration agreement 
that did not expressly provide authority for injunctive relief and precluded class 
actions in claim under Truth in Lending Act). 
298. Broughton v. Cigna Healthplans, 90 Cal. Rptr. 2d 334 (Cal. 1999). 
299. Id. at 350. The court remanded the damages portion of the claim to the 
lower court for a determination of its arbitrability. Id. 
300. Id. at 345 & n.5. 
301. Id. at 345. 
302. Id. 
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injunctive relief.303 Other courts have disagreed with the California 
Supreme Court's decision in Broughton, however. For example, the 
Superior Court of Connecticut found that the Connecticut State 
Medical Society could not bring unfair trade practices claims on 
behalf of its members because the members had agreed to 
arbitrate.304 The court refused to rely on Broughton, noting that 
there was no showing that an arbitrator could not enjoin any unfair 
t . 305 prac ices. 
While the Broughton decision has had limited impact, it 
suggests some of the reasons that arbitrators may be reluctant to 
issue broad injunctive relief and points out the problems with 
enforcement of arbitral injunctions. In light of these concerns, if the 
agreement or the law does not expressly authorize broad injunctive 
relief, either directly or by incorporating the statutory remedies, the 
arbitration agreement should be found unlawful under the NLRA 
for it interferes with the right to engage in concerted activity.306 
Although an arbitrator might read an agreement to provide broad 
remedial authority, two principles justify invalidating agreements 
that do not specifically provide authority for broad injunctive relief. 
First, the ambiguous agreement should be construed against the 
drafter, the employer seeking to compel arbitration. Second, if the 
arbitrator exceeds his or her authority under the agreement by 
awarding unauthorized relief, the award can be set aside by a 
court.307 Accordingly, in order for an agreement to pass muster 
under Section 7, it should specifically authorize broad injunctive 
relief if it would be available in court.308 
3. Individual Claims for Statutory Violations 
The most difficult case for concerted activity is the individual 
303. Id. at 345-46; accord Gray v. Conseco, Inc., No. SA CV 00-322 
DOC(EEx), 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14821, at *24-26 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2000) 
(refusing to order arbitration of plaintiffs' claim for injunctive relief against 
unfair business practices under the California Code). 
304. Conn. State Medical Soc'y v. Oxford Health Plans, Inc., No. 
X01CV0165664S, 2001 Conn. Super. LEXIS 3555, at *22 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 
13, 2001). 
305. Id. at *21-22. 
306. See Lozada v. Dale Baker Oldsmobile, Inc., 91 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1105 
(W.D. Mich. 2000) (finding unconscionable and unenforceable arbitration 
agreement that did not expressly provide authority for injunctive relief and 
precluded class actions in claim under Truth in Lending Act). 
307. See 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4) (2000). 
308. Although the Court in Gilmer refused to deny arbitration on the ground 
that broad injunctive relief was not available, it specifically found that the 
arbitration agreement at issue did not preclude such relief. Gilmer v. 
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 32 (1991). 
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action taken to improve terms and conditions of employment. It is 
argued above that the best reading of the Act is that such action is 
protected by Section 7. Should the Board so rule, then no 
nonsupervisory employee covered by the Act could be compelled to 
agree to arbitrate any claims. In most cases, this would involve 
enforcement of statutory claims, for employees may have no right to 
litigate many issues related to improvement of terms and conditions 
of employment. For example, Professors Gorman and Fin.kin offer 
several examples of individual activity by employees in nonunion 
companies relating to terms and conditions of employment.309 One 
example is the employee who complains that he is underpaid 
because his job requires more skill than that of other employees paid 
at his rate. 310 Another is the employee who challenges denial of a 
promotion which she is entitled to by virtue of her seniority, where 
the employer traditionally follows seniority in promotions.311 
Requiring arbitration of these disputes would not deprive the 
employees of any right to engage in concerted activity unless they 
had a contractual right to the payment or promotion that was 
enforceable through litigation. An employee who could not litigate 
an individual claim that Title VII was violated in compensation or 
promotion, however, would be deprived of a Section 7 right by a 
compulsory arbitration agreement. 
4. Summary 
I have argued, thus far, that Section 7 should be construed to 
protect the individual filing of a lawsuit to enforce statutory or 
contractual rights. Such a conclusion would bar employers from 
imposing arbitration agreements unilaterally on employees covered 
by the Act, if the agreement would preclude litigation. 312 Even 
absent such a construction of Section 7, however, a mandatory 
arbitration agreement should be found unlawful if it does not 
expressly permit the unquestionably concerted activities of class 
actions, joint claims, and broad injunctive relief.313 Because the case 
309. See Gorman & Finkin, supra note 99, at 286. 
310. Id. 
311. Id. 
312. So long as the agreement was imposed as a condition of employment, it 
would be unlawful under this analysis, regardless of whether it was a condition 
of hiring or of retaining employment. 
313. Such an interpretation is compatible with the criticism of ADR as 
inconsistent with public rights, which posits that the courts are necessary 
instruments for defining the social and political values of a society. See THOMAS 
E. CARBONNEAU, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: MELTING THE LANCES AND 
DISMOUNTING THE STEEDS 244-45 (1989). In the employment arena, the courts 
would be preserved as the litigation forum for class actions, consolidated claims, 
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law regarding employment arbitration and class actions is in a very 
early stage of development, there is substantial uncertainty 
regarding whether either class or joint arbitration is available. 
Accordingly, in determining whether a mandatory arbitration 
agreement is lawful and enforceable, the Board and the courts 
should assume that neither class nor joint arbitration is permissible 
unless the agreement expressly provides otherwise.314 The context 
in which such decisions would be made is discussed below. 
VII. THE CONTEXT OF DECISIONS 
A The National Labor Relations Board 
Like many other issues in labor and employment law, the issue 
of the legality of a compulsory arbitration agreement under Section 
8(a)(l) may potentially arise in two forums. An unfair labor practice 
charge could be filed alleging that such an agreement was 
unlawful. 315 The NLRB would then be required to decide the legality 
of the agreement. If the agreement was imposed as a condition of 
and actions seeking broad injunctive relief, which are more likely to implicate 
public values than purely individual claims under the employment laws. See 
McGowan, supra note 189, at 261 (noting that class actions can result in 
changes in unlawful policies and procedures that affect large numbers of 
employees, in addition to remedying prior discrimination and prohibiting future 
discrimination); Moohr, supra note 20, at 439 (arguing that "litigation is more 
effective than arbitration in achieving the long-term public policy goal of ending 
workplace discrimination"). Notably, the securities industry, long a user and 
proponent of arbitration, has preserved the right to litigate class actions. 
Sternlight, supra note 3, at 45-49. In approving the rules rejecting class 
arbitration and preserving the right to litigate, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission stated that class action litigation "protect[s] investors and the 
public interest." Id. at 47-48 (quoting Order Approving Proposed Rule Change 
by American Stock Exchange, Inc. Relating to Arbitration, 58 Fed. Reg. 48,681 
(SEC Sept. 10, 1993)). 
314. Assuming that the agreement does not permit such action unless it 
provides so expressly is not only consistent with the uncertainty of existing law, 
but also would encourage employers to include express provisions in the 
agreement in order to insure enforceability, thus preserving employee rights to 
concerted activity. As set forth below, however, a court considering the issue in 
the context of a motion to compel arbitration of a statutory claim could interpret 
that agreement to permit class or consolidated arbitration and broad injunctive 
relief, thereby avoiding the Section 7 issue. See infra note 343. 
315. Such a claim could also arise before the NLRB as an objection to a 
representation election. See, e.g., Freund Baking Co., 336 N.L.R.B. No. 75, at 
*1 (Oct. 1, 2001) (setting aside election based on employee handbook provision 
that barred employee disclosure of proprietary or confidential information 
which included "all information obtained by the employees during the course of 
their work"). 
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employment and precludes employees froin engaging in concerted 
activity, as defined above, the Board should find the agreement 
unlawful and unenforceable. The employer should be ordered to 
cease and desist from enforcing the agreement and from imposing it 
on employees. In addition, termination of, or refusal to hire, an 
employee who declined to waive Section 7 rights by agreeing to 
arbitration should be found to violate Section 8(a)(l).316 
It might be argued that the Board should not be concerned with 
a compulsory agreement to arbitrate claims under other statutes by 
either union or nonunion employees. Instead, determination of the 
legality of such agreements should be left to the enforcement 
agencies and courts interpreting those statutes.317 As noted by the 
General Counsel in the Bentley's Luggage memorandum, the 
consequences of an arbitration agreement are different for NLRB 
cases than for discrimination cases, since the NLRB can act only 
after the filing of a charge, while the EEOC can initiate its own 
action.318 Accordingly, the compulsory arbitration agreement would 
not completely preclude statutory enforcement in the discrimination 
context.319 Nevertheless, the EEOC rarely files suit, and may be 
316. See supra notes 164-69 and accompanying text. For an argument that 
terminating or refusing to hire an employee based on that employee's refusal to 
sign such an agreement violates the anti-retaliation provisions of Title VII, see 
Sidney Charlotte Reynolds, Closing a Discrimination Loophole: Using Title VII's 
Anti-Retaliation Provision to Prevent Employers from Requiring Unlawful 
Arbitration Agreements as Conditions of Continued Employment, 76 WASH. L. 
REV. 957, 977-88 (2001). But see Weeks v. Harden Mfg. Corp., 291 F.3d 1307, 
1315 (11th Cir. 2002) (holding employees did not have objectively reasonable 
belief that mandatory arbitration provision was unlawful and therefore their 
refusal to sign was not protected by Title VII's anti-retaliation provision). 
317. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991) 
(stating that agreement to arbitrate statutory claim would be enforced unless 
Congress indicated in the statute an intent to preclude arbitration). 
318. See Nash v. Fla. Indus. Comm'n, 389 U.S. 235, 238 n.3 (1967) (citing 29 
U.S.C. §§ lO(a)-(b) (2000) and noting NLRB's limited authority); Regulations 
relating to Labor, 29 C.F.R. § 1601.11 (2002) (authorizing EEOC 
Commissioners to file charges with the agency); see also Fair Labor Standards 
Act, 29 U.S.C. § 216(c) (stating "[t]he Secretary may bring an action in any 
court of competent jurisdiction to recover the amount of unpaid minimum wages 
or overtime compensation and an equal amount as liquidated damages"); cf id. 
§ 2104(a)(5) (requiring judicial enforcement by affected parties under the 
WARN Act). 
319. In Gilmer, the Court indicated that the employee could file a charge 
with the EEOC despite the arbitration agreement. 500 U.S. at 28. In EEOC v. 
Waffie House, Inc., the Supreme Court held that the EEOC can litigate and 
recover individual relief on behalf of those who have signed arbitration 
agreements. 534 U.S. 279, 297-98 (2002). In the wake of Waffie House, the 
United States Department of Labor, which has enforcement authority under, 
inter alia, OSHA, FLSA, certain whistleblower statutes, the FMLA, and the 
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unaware of discrimination without the filing of a charge.320 Yet, if 
the employee has agreed to arbitrate, he or she may never file a 
charge.321 In addition, there are perils for the agency acting without 
evidence from a charging party or parties.322 Thus the EEOC may 
never act in cases where employees are bound by an arbitration 
agreement. Moreover, as set forth above, the Board has long 
protected the right to engage in concerted activity to remedy 
violations of statutes other than the Act and to alter working 
conditions through enforcement of employer promises. Further, the 
Act specifically authorizes the Board to prevent unfair labor 
practices, despite the existence of other legal means to achieve the 
same goal.323 As in National Licorice, the Board should order 
employers to cease enforcing or imposing agreements to arbitrate 
employment law claims. 
B. Court Litigation of Statutory and Contractual Actions 
The other way in which the issue of the validity of a compulsory 
arbitration agreement would arise is in a statutory or contractual 
enforcement action filed in court by an employee. In such a case, the 
employer would seek a stay or dismissal of the case based on the 
arbitration agreement. When the employee argued that the 
agreement was unenforceable because it violated Section 7, the 
court would be faced with an issue requiring it to interpret the 
Vietnam Era Veterans' Readjustment Assistance Act, issued a directive 
suggesting that deferral to arbitration by the agency often will not be 
appropriate in FLSA cases. See United States Department of Labor, Solicitor of 
Labor, Memorandum for Regional Solicitors Associate Solicitors, DAILY LAB. 
REP. (BNA) No. 156, at E-22 (Aug. 13, 2002). In addition, the directive specified 
that the issue of whether the employee retains any rights to proceed through 
collective action will be a factor in determining whether the agency will defer to 
arbitration. See id. 
320. See supra note 5. 
321. See Waffie House, Inc., 534 U.S at 296 n.11 (noting that employees 
subject to arbitration agreements might never file charges with the EEOC if 
injunctive relief were the only possible remedy). 
322. The case of EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. illustrates some of the 
difficulties of proceeding without a charge filed by an employee or applicant. 
839 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1988). In Sears, the EEOC presented only statistical 
evidence supporting its allegations of discrimination, without anecdotal 
evidence of instances of discrimination. Id. at 310-11. While not fatal to the 
claim, the absence of such evidence was an important factor in the court's 
decision that the EEOC did not prove discrimination. Id. at 311-12. 
323. 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) ("The Board is empowered, as hereinafter provided, 
to prevent any person from engaging in any unfair labor practice (listed in 
section 158 of this title) affecting commerce. This power shall not be affected by 
any other means of adjustment or prevention that has been or may be 
established by agreement, law, or otherwise."). 
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NLRA. If the NLRB has already ruled on the legality of the 
particular agreement, the court can simply defer to the decision of 
the Board. Where it has not, there may be a question of whether the 
court can or should decide an issue within the primary jurisdiction 
oftheNLRB. 
When faced with motions to stay or dismiss lawsuits based on 
arbitration agreements in employment cases involving employees 
covered by the Act, 324 courts should decline to do so if the agreement 
was imposed on the employees as a condition of employment.325 A 
contract or agreement to arbitrate that violates the NLRA is 
unenforceable under general principles of contract law, as well as 
the principles of arbitration. The Supreme Court has held that 
"generally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or 
unconscionability, may be applied to invalidate arbitration 
agreements."326 Further, the Court has repeatedly stated that 
contracts, including arbitration awards, in violation of law or public 
policy will not be enforced. 327 This is an application of the common 
324. Since the National Labor Relations Act does not cover supervisors and 
managers, inter alia, it would not violate the Act to compel such individuals to 
agree to arbitration. In addition, the Act does not cover railroad and airline 
employees. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text. 
325. The task of the courts applying the National Labor Relations Act in 
these cases will be easier once the NLRB has addressed and decided the issue. 
Their task might be rendered easier still if the NLRB were to issue rules as to 
the legality of compulsory arbitration agreements. Given the Board's general 
reluctance to use rulemaking and the controversy generated when it has chosen 
to do so, however, rulemaking regarding arbitration agreements is unlikely. 
See Joan Flynn, The Costs and Benefits of "Hiding the Ball": NLRB 
Policymaking and the Failure of Judicial Review, 75 B.U. L. REV. 387, 388-91 
(1995) (discussing the Board's failure to use rulemaking and criticisms of the 
Board's choice to make rules by adjudication); Deborah Billings & Bernard 
Mower, House Appropriations Markup Targets Labor Board for 15 Percent 
Funding Cut, [1996] DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 114, at D-3 (June 13, 1996) 
(noting efforts to cut budget and attach appropriations rider barring action on 
proposed rule on single location bargaining units, based on business opposition 
to rule); Edward Silver & Joan McAvoy, The National Labor Relations Act at 
the Crossroads, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 181, 196-99 (1987) (discussing the Board's 
failure to use rulemaking and criticisms of the Board's choice to make rules by 
adjudication); NLRB Notice on Withdrawal of Proposed Rulemakings On Single 
Location Bargaining Units, Standardized Remedial Provision, DAILY LAB. REP. 
(BNA), at D-24 (Feb. 23, 1998) (withdrawing rulemaking proposals and noting 
that Congressional riders had prohibited Board· from issuing a final rule on 
single location bargaining units for three years). 
326. Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996). 
327. See E. Associated Coal Corp. v. United Mine Workers of Am., 531 U.S. 
57, 62 (2000) (citing "the legal exception that makes unenforceable 'a collective-
bargaining agreement that is contrary to public policy"' (quoting W.R. Grace & 
Co. v. Rubber Workers, 461 U.S. 757, 766 (1983))); United Paperworkers Int'l 
Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 42 (1987) (citing the "general doctrine, rooted 
in the common law, that a court may refuse to enforce contracts that violate law 
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law doctrine, "derive[d] from the basic notion that no court will lend 
its aid to one who founds a cause of action upon an immoral or 
illegal act.'.a28 Compelling arbitration where the agreement to 
arbitrate was imposed in violation of an employee's Section 7 rights 
would place the court in a position of enforcing an unlawful 
agreement. Moreover, forcing an employee to agree to arbitration in 
violation of Section 7 rights renders the agreement unconscionable. 
Thus, the court must determine the legality of the arbitration 
agreement. 
In contract actions under Section 301 of the NLRA, the 
Supreme Court has held that the courts can determine the validity 
of a contract alleged to be unlawful under the NLRA where the court 
otherwise has jurisdiction of the action. In Kaiser Steel Corp. v. 
Mullins,329 the Court found that the lower court had jurisdiction 
under Section 301 to adjudicate the employer's defense that the 
contract provision that formed the basis of the suit violated Section 
8(e) of the Act.33° Following Kaiser Steel, the First Circuit in 
Courier-Citizen Co. v. Boston Electrotypers Union No. 11,331 
considered whether a contract provision violated Section 8(b)(3) of 
the Act, in deciding whether to enforce an arbitration award.332 The 
court stated: "as the federal courts may not enforce a contractual 
provision that violates section 8 of the Act, they may be obliged at 
times, in the course of resolving a contract dispute, to decide 
whether or not such a violation exists."333 Subsequently, in Textron 
or public policy"); W.R. Grace, 461 U.S. at 766 ("As with any contract, however, 
a court may not enforce a collective-bargaining agreement that is contrary to 
public policy."); Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948) The Hurd court stated: 
The power of the federal courts to enforce the terms of private 
agreements is at all times exercised subject to the restrictions and 
limitations of the public policy of the United States as manifested in 
the Constitution, treaties, federal statutes, and applicable legal 
precedents. Where the enforcement of private agreements would be 
violative of that policy, it is the obligation of courts to refrain from 
such exertions of judicial power. 
Id. at 34-35 (footnotes omitted); cf Szetela v. Discover Bank, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
862, 867-68 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (invalidating arbitration agreement provision 
precluding class actions as substantively unconscionable and against public 
policy). 
328. United Paperworkers Int'l Union, 484 U.S. at 42. 
329. 455 U.S. 72 (1982). 
330. Id. at 83. Section 8(e) makes hot cargo agreements unenforceable. See 
29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (2000). 
331. 702 F.2d 273 (1st Cir. 1983). 
332. Id. at 276-77. 
333. Id. at 276 n.6. But see Mo-Kan Teamsters Pension Fund v. Creason, 
716 F.2d 772, 775 (10th Cir. 1983) (reading Kaiser Steel as limited to Section 
8(e) defenses and refusing to permit employer to defend against Section 301 
contract enforcement action on ground that contract violated NLRA because 
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Lycoming Reciprocating Engine Division v. United Automobile 
Workers,334 the Supreme Court determined that there is no 
jurisdiction under Section 301 where the actual claim is not a breach 
of contract but rather an unfair labor practice.335 Nevertheless, the 
Court stated: 
This does not mean that. a federal court can never 
adjudicate the validity of a contract under § 301(a). That 
provision simply erects a gateway through which parties may 
pass into federal court; once they have entered, it does not 
restrict the legal landscape they may traverse .... But in these 
cases, the federal court's power to adjudicate the contract's 
validity is ancillary to, and not independent of, its power to 
adjudicate "[s]uits for violation of contracts."336 
Similarly, courts determine unfair labor practice issues in 
Section 303 actions for damages for violation of Section 8(b)(4).337 
Under Section 303, the court must determine whether a violation of 
Section 8(b)(4) has occurred, since that is a predicate for damages, 
but no NLRB adjudication of the 8(b)(4) issue is required.338 While 
most courts give NLRB decisions on underlying 8(b)(4) claims 
preclusive effect, the court can determine the 8(b)(4) issue in the 
absence of a Board decision.339 And under antitrust law, the courts 
may also decide issues normally reserved to the NLRB for purposes 
of deciding whether the labor exemption to antitrust liability has 
been met.340 In Connell Construction Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters 
Local Union No. 100,341 the Supreme Court stated: ''This Court has 
held, however, that the federal courts may decide labor law 
questions that emerge as collateral issues in suits brought under 
independent federal remedies, including the antitrust laws.''342 
Accordingly, where a legal action has been filed under an 
employment discrimination or other employment law statute, the 
court can determine whether there is a lawful agreement to 
arbitrate even if that determination requires interpretation of the 
union did not have a majority). 
334. 523 U.S. 653 (1998). 
335. Id. at 657. 
336. Id. at 657-58. 
337. 29 u.s.c. § 187 (2000). 
338. Int'l Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's Union v. Juneau Spruce 
Corp., 342 U.S. 237, 243-44 (1952). 
339. 2 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 1733-35 (Patrick Hardin & John E. 
Higgins, Jr., eds., 4th ed. 2001). 
340. See Local Union No. 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher 
Workmen v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 684-88 (1965). 
341. 421 U.S. 616 (1975). 
342. Id. at 626. 
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NLRA 343 Once the NLRB has ruled on the legal issue, of course, its 
interpretation of the law will be entitled to deference from the 
courts. 344 In the Circuit City case mentioned above, 345 for example, 
the arbitration policy, imposed as a condition of employment,346 had 
the potential for denying employees their right to engage in the 
concerted activity of a class action discrimination claim. Rather 
than dismiss the claims of those who agreed to arbitration, the court 
should have determined three issues. Did the arbitration procedure 
expressly permit class claims? If not, was the agreement imposed as 
a condition of employment? If so, were the employees in the class 
covered by the NLRA? If the answer to the latter question was yes, 
then the employees' claims should not have been dismissed and 
assuming all other class prerequisites were met, the case should 
have been permitted to proceed as a class action. 347 Even under this 
analysis of course, there is still the potential that a class action may 
be frustrated if a sufficient number of members of the potential class 
are supervisors and not covered by the Act. Analysis under Section 
7 is necessary, however, to avoid depriving employees of their 
statutory rights to engage in concerted activity. 
343. Alternatively, the court could stay the action pending a decision by the 
NLRB on the legality of the arbitration agreement, if an unfair labor practice 
charge has been, or could be, timely filed. This course of action would cause 
substantial delay in the proceeding, however. A third possibility is to interpret 
the ambiguous arbitration agreement so that it is lawful. See Cole v. Burns 
Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1485 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (interpreting silent 
agreement to require employer to pay arbitration fees to render agreement 
enforceable). Thus, if the agreement is unlawful only because it does not 
expressly permit class actions or consolidation of claims, the court could 
interpret the agreement to permit such claims in arbitration. The NLRB, 
however, should still invalidate such agreements because of their chilling effect 
on concerted activity. If the employee has already filed a lawsuit, the court 
might conclude, at least with respect to that employee, that there was no 
chilling effect. 
344. NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., 494 U.S. 775, 786-87 (1990) 
(citing the Board's primary responsibility for developing national labor policy 
and the necessary deference accorded by the courts so long as the Board's rules 
are "rational and consistent with the Act"). 
345. See supra notes 216-19 and accompanying text. 
346. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 122 (2001). 
347. If only arbitration agreements that prevent class actions and 
consolidated claims are unlawful, employees may be encouraged to file such 
claims in inappropriate circumstances to avoid arbitration. If the court declines 
to certify the class or to consolidate the claims because the necessary 
prerequisites are not met, however, then a motion to stay or dismiss based on 
the arbitration agreement could be made and granted. If a court finds that the 
pleadings were filed for improper purposes, sanctions under Rule 11 could be 
assessed against the plaintiff(s) and attorney(s). FED. R. C1v. P. 11. 
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VIII. CONCLUSION 
Arbitration agreements imposed on employees as a condition of 
employment violate Section 7 of the NLRA by requiring waiver of 
the right to engage in the concerted activity of filing a judicial claim 
for enforcement of statutory or contractual rights. Accordingly, such 
agreements should not be enforced. Even if this broad reading of 
concerted activity is not accepted, however, compulsory arbitration 
agreements that deny employees the right to bring class actions, 
joint claims, and claims for broad injunctive relief force employees to 
waive their Section 7 rights to obtain employment. Invalidation of 
such agreements is necessary to preserve the rights accorded to 
employees by Congress in the NLRA. Supporters of arbitration need 
not fear that arbitration will be eliminated by such an 
interpretation. The cadre of supervisors and managers unaffected 
by such a ruling will continue to provide fodder for the arbitration 
mill. In addition, employers can offer employees covered by the Act 
the opportunity to use arbitration after a dispute has arisen. If the 
arbitration system is of proven value, it will be used. 
